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iABSTRACT
Behavioral synthesis is the process of compiling an Electronic System Level (ESL)
design to a register-transfer level (RTL) implementation. ESL specifications define
the design functionality at a high level of abstraction (e.g., with C/C++ or Sys-
temC), and thus provide a promising approach to address the exacting demands
to develop feature-rich, optimized, and complex hardware systems within aggres-
sive time-to-market schedules. Behavioral synthesis entails application of complex
and error-prone transformations during the compilation process. Therefore, the
adoption of behavioral synthesis highly depends on our ability to ensure that the
synthesized RTL conforms to the ESL description.
This dissertation provides an end-to-end scalable equivalence checking support
for behavioral synthesis. The major challenge of this research is to bridge the
huge semantic gap between the ESL and RTL descriptions, which makes the direct
comparison of designs in ESL and RTL difficult. Moreover, a large number and a
wide variety of aggressive transformations from front-end to back-end require an
end-to-end scalable checking framework.
A behavioral synthesis flow can be divided into three major phases, including
1) front-end : compiler transformations, 2) scheduling : assigning each operation
a clock cycle and satisfying the user-specified constraints, and 3) back-end : local
optimizations and RTL generation. In our end-to-end and incremental equivalence
checking framework, we check each of the three phases one by one. Firstly, we check
ii
the front-end that consists of a sequence of compiler transformations by decompos-
ing it into a series of checks, one for each transformation applied. We symbolically
explore paths in the input and output programs of each transformation, and check
whether the input and output programs have the same observable behavior under
the same path condition. Secondly, we validate the scheduling transformation by
checking the preservation of control and data dependencies, and the preservation
of I/O timing in the user-specified scheduling mode. Thirdly, we symbolically sim-
ulate the scheduled design and the generated RTL cycle by cycle, and check the
equivalence of each mapped variables. We also develop several key optimizations
to make our back-end checker scale to real industrial-strength designs. In addition
to the equivalence checking framework, we also present an approach to detect-
ing deadlocks introduced by parallelization of RTL blocks that are connected by
synthesized interfaces with handshaking protocols.
To demonstrate the efficiency and scalability of our framework, we evaluated
it on transformations applied by a behavioral synthesis tool to designs from the
C-based CHStone and SystemC-based S2CBench benchmarks. Based on the eval-
uation results, our front-end checker can efficiently validate more than 75 percent
of the total of 1008 compiler transformations applied to designs from the CHStone
benchmark, taking an average time of 1.5 seconds per transformation. Our schedul-
ing checker can validate control-data dependencies and I/O timing of all designs
from S2CBench benchmark. Our back-end checker can handle designs with more
than 32K lines of synthesized RTL from the CHStone benchmark, which demon-
strates the scalability of the checker. Furthermore, our checker found several bugs
in a commercial tool, underlining both the importance of formal equivalence check-
ing and the effectiveness of our approach.
iii
DEDICATION
To my wife Jialu.
To my parents Xiuzeng and Yunpeng.
In memory of my grandmother Xiuli Zhang (1920 – 2004)
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation could not have been accomplished without generous support from
many talented people. I am grateful to all of them from the bottom of my heart.
First and foremost, I would like to express my great appreciation to my advisor,
Prof. Fei Xie, for his enlightening guidance and generous support during my Ph.D
study. Prof. Xie is an excellent advisor. He taught me how to identify research
problems and become an independent researcher. Without his support and encour-
agement, this dissertation would not have been accomplished. His deep theoretical
knowledge and passion about developing practical tools have great influence on my
Ph.D research and future career.
I would like to thank Prof. Suresh Singh, Prof. Feng Liu, Dr. Sandip Ray, and
Prof. Fu Li for serving on my dissertation committee. Thanks for their advice and
sacrifice of valuable summer time for coming to my dissertation defense.
I would like to thank Dr. Kecheng Hao and Dr. Sandip Ray. I benefit a lot
from the great infrastructure they built before I joined the group. Many research
ideas of this dissertation come from fruitful discussions with them. I sincerely
thank them for being excellent collaborators. I am grateful that I have this great
opportunity to work with talented group members: Kai Cong, Li Lei, Bin Lin,
Disha Puri, Bo Chen, and Christopher Havlicek.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their continuous support and
endless love. Special thanks to my wife Jialu for her sound and complete love.
vTable of Contents
Abstract i
Dedication iii
Acknowledgments iv
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
List of Abbreviations xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Proposed Equivalence Checking Framework . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 2 Background 8
2.1 Behavioral Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Symbolic Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Formal Equivalence Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter 3 Front-end Compiler Transformation Checking 12
3.1 Notations and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Equivalence Checking Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Modular Reasoning across Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Handling Loops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vi
3.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Chapter 4 Validating Scheduling Transformation 32
4.1 Scheduling Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2 Formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Validation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.1 Validating Trace Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.2 Validating I/O Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter 5 Scaling Back-end RTL Generation Checking 49
5.1 Equivalence Checking Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 Handling Operation Gating Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3 Handling Global Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4.1 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4.2 A Behavioral Synthesis Bug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 6 Interface Synthesis Checking 64
6.1 Interface Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2 Deadlock Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2.1 Deadlock Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2.2 Deadlock Detection Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work 79
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
References 82
vii
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Summary of CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Checking
of Front-end Compiler Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 3.2 Summary of Evaluation on CHStone Benchmark for Equiva-
lence Checking of Front-end Compiler Transformations . . . . 25
Table 4.1 Summary of Evaluation on S2CBench Benchmark . . . . . . . 44
Table 5.1 Summary of CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Checking
of Back-end RTL Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table 5.2 Summary of Evaluation on CHStone Benchmark for Equiva-
lence Checking of Back-end RTL Generation . . . . . . . . . . 59
viii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Behavioral synthesis flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 1.2 Behavioral synthesis and verification flow . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2.1 A simple function foo in C with its symbolic execution tree.
(a) Function foo in C. (b) Symbolic execution tree of foo,
where F and X are symbolic values for *f and x, r denotes
the return value, and nil denotes that the value is not yet
available. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 3.1 Framework of checking equivalence between program S and T ,
which are the input and output of transformation T respectively. 14
Figure 3.2 A simple function bar in C with its symbolic execution tree.
(a) Function bar in C. (b) Symbolic execution tree of bar,
where F and X are symbolic values for *f and x, r denotes the
return value, and nil denotes that the value is not yet available. 17
Figure 3.3 Symbolic execution tree of function foo and bar, where bar
is executed after foo, and based on the execution condition
of foo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 3.4 Global variable usage with sub-function call example. . . . . . 20
Figure 3.5 A simple function with a loop in C and its IR. (a) Function f
has an unbounded for loop. (b) The IR of f, with boxes rep-
resenting basic blocks, and arrows representing control flow.
Control flow merge is implemented via φ-instructions in basic
block B2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Figure 3.6 Comparison of success rate on designs of CHStone benchmark
without and with cut-loop optimization. The x axis is ordered
by the success rate with cut-loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
ix
Figure 4.1 An example of a SystemC thread, which has two superstates
in the while loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 4.2 Cycle-fixed and superstate-fixed scheduling mode for the while
loop in thread in Fig. 4.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 4.3 Extract superstates of a thread in SystemC. (a) my thread is
a thread of module dut, wait statements are the boundary of
superstates in SystemC. (b) Superstates and their transitions
of my thread. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 4.4 An example of incorrect scheduling of signal I/O. (a). Design
before scheduling, where a signal output Out is written twice
with different values, however, only the last write is visible
and valid. (b). The design after scheduling, where two writes
of Out are scheduled to two different cycles. For simplicity, we
use function add state() to represent the scheduling trans-
formation will add a new state on that line. . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 4.5 An example of incorrect scheduling of signal I/O. (a). Design
before scheduling, where a local signal sig is written and then
read at the same cycle. The read statement takes the old
value. (b). The design after scheduling, where the write and
read statements are scheduled to two different cycles, then
the read takes the new value. For simplicity, we use function
add state() to represent the scheduling transformation will
add a new state on that line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Figure 5.1 Dual-rail cycle-based symbolic simulation of a CCDFG and
RTL circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 5.2 Operation gating example. (a) C code. (b) Data flow graph.
(c) Schematic of generated RTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 5.3 Simplified C source code of the MOTION example. . . . . . . . 61
Figure 5.4 Bug found in the MOTION example, where an important regis-
ter is eliminated. (a). Wrong RTL (b). Correct RTL . . . . . 62
xFigure 6.1 Example of interface synthesis. (a). A simple C function with
one input and two outputs. (b). Synthesized block diagram of
the C function. Input IN has an associated valid signal IN vld
to indicate when IN is ready to be read. Output O1 has an as-
sociated acknowledge signal O1 ack to allow the downstream
block to acknowledge block ‘func’ that the output data O1 has
been read. Output O 2 has both valid and acknowledge signals. 65
Figure 6.2 Timing diagram of the synthesized block ‘func’. . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 6.3 Block diagram of a FIFO with read and write ports. Signals
empty and full indicate the emptiness and fullness of the
FIFO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 6.4 Timing diagram of a FIFO with depth of 2. . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 6.5 A design in C with three blocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Figure 6.6 Deadlock example: a synthesized design with three blocks.
Interface C is a FIFO of depth of 2. Interfaces B and D are
FIFOs of depth of 1. (a). FIFOs are initialize to be empty.
(b). Status of FIFOs when the design deadlocks. . . . . . . . 70
Figure 6.7 Dependency graph of Fig. 6.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 6.8 Dependency graph example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Figure 6.9 Block diagram of DCT example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 6.10Block diagram of YUV Filter example. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BDD Binary Decision Diagram
CCDFG Clocked Control/Data Flow Graph
CDFG Control/Data Flow Graph
DFG Data Flow Graph
EDA Electronic Design Automation
ESL Electronic System Level
FIFO First In, First Out
FSMD Finite State Machine with Datapath
HLS High-Level Synthesis
IP Intellectual Property
IR Intermediate Representation
PSL Property Specification Language
RTL Register Transfer Level
SAT Boolean satisfiability problem
SEC Sequential Equivalence Checking
SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theories
SSA Single Static Assignment
STP State Transition Partition
SVA SystemVerilog Assertions
1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION
With the ever-growing complexity in modern VLSI systems, designing high-quality
hardware at Register-Transfer Level (RTL) under high time-to-market pressure is
challenging. Behavioral synthesis, also called high-level synthesis (HLS), is the
process of compiling an Electronic System Level (ESL) design to an RTL imple-
mentation. ESL specifications define the design functionality at a high level of
abstraction (e.g., with C/C++ or SystemC), and thus provide a promising ap-
proach to address the exacting demands to develop feature-rich, optimized, and
complex hardware systems within aggressive time-to-market schedules. Recent
years have seen the adoption of behavioral synthesis in industry. A typical exam-
ple is how Google uses a behavioral synthesis tool to design the G2 VP9 hardware
decoder [72] to implement the VP9 video compression standard.
As shown in Fig. 1.1, a behavioral synthesis takes a design specified in high-
level languages, applies a sequence of transformations, and generates targeted RTL
netlist. A typical behavioral synthesis flow can be roughly divided into three
phases: front-end, scheduling and back-end. The front-end primarily entails com-
piler transformations; the goal is to reduce code complexity of the generated design,
maximize data locality, etc. [19], and transform the design into a form more suit-
able for resource allocation and control synthesis. The scheduling transformation
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Figure 1.1: Behavioral synthesis flow
schedules each operation a clock cycle to execute. The scheduled design needs
to satisfy user-specified timing and resource constraints at the same time. The
back-end entails local, sometimes manual, optimizations for a number of metrics,
e.g., performance and power consumption, and generates RTL at the end.
Behavioral synthesis provides two major advantages over traditional design
methodology: accelerated development and fast verification. Firstly, development
of the functionality at a higher abstraction level is much more efficient than devel-
opment at RTL. Secondly, functional verification can be done at high-level, which
is usually hundreds of times faster than verification at RTL in terms of runtime.
However, the expensive verification efforts of generated RTL can be saved only if
we guarantee that behavioral synthesis tool generates correct RTL from the ESL
specification. Therefore despite that there are several commercial behavioral syn-
thesis tools available, the adoption of behavioral synthesis critically depends on
3our ability to ensure that the synthesized designs indeed correctly implement the
ESL specifications. The goal of this research is to provide a formal equivalence
checking support for behavioral synthesis, with the emphasis on scalability and
end-to-end checking ability.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Real industrial designs are typically thousands or even tens of thousands of lines
of C/C++ code. The performance (runtime and memory usage) of the equivalence
checker should scale to large industrial designs. To provide a scalable end-to-end
formal equivalence checking support for behavioral synthesis, we need to decom-
pose the verification flow into phases that are defined in the behavioral synthesis
flow, and address the following challenges for different phases.
• How to check front-end compiler transformations? Front-end transformations
constitute the majority of synthesis transformations. It is typical that more
than a hundred transformations are applied to a design. Furthermore, they
are applied aggressively under delicate and implicit invariants, and tend to
be complex and error-prone.
• How to validate scheduling transformation? Scheduling transformation is
usually a very aggressive, complicated, thus error-prone transformation to
meet the timing and resource constraints. It entails sophisticated heuristics
to minimize register usage, improve timing and possibilities for sharing. The
scheduling transformation not only needs to preserve control and data depen-
dencies of the original design, but also needs to accommodate user specified
timing constraints: either compiler directives or wait statements explicitly
specified in the design. In this dissertation, we don’t consider pipelining in
the scheduling transformation.
4• How to make the back-end checking framework scale to industrial-strength
designs? Previous work [36, 64] proposed a dual-rail symbolic simulation
framework to check the equivalence between the design after scheduling trans-
formation and the synthesized RTL. However, the framework is inadequate
to handle design and implementation optimizations, therefore it is not scal-
able to real industrial-strength designs. In order to improve the scalability
of the framework, we need a robust approach to handling the design and
implementation optimizations.
• How to detect deadlocks introduced by parallelization of RTL blocks that are
connected by synthesized interfaces with handshaking protocols? Behavioral
synthesis tools allow designers to synthesize concurrent RTL blocks from
a sequential high-level specification, and to synthesize interfaces between
blocks into pre-defined interface components with handshaking protocols.
Allowing blocks to run concurrently may introduce deadlocks. Therefore,
we need scalable approach to detecting deadlocks in the synthesized RTL
implementations.
1.3 PROPOSED EQUIVALENCE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
Because of the huge semantic gap between the ESL specification and the generated
RTL implementation, and the fact that a large number of transformations will be
applied to the ESL design, it is extremely hard to check equivalence of the ESL
design and the RTL implementation directly. This research focuses on the ability
of checking the entire behavioral synthesis flow and the scalability to industrial-
strength designs. Instead of checking the ESL and RTL directly, we employ an
incremental checking approach, taking advantage of the similarity of the design
representations before and after each transformation. We establish intermediate
5equivalence points in the checking flow by decomposing the checking into a se-
quence of checks, one for each transformation applied by the behavioral synthesis
tool. This incremental approach is essential to the scalability of our framework.
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Figure 1.2: Behavioral synthesis and verification flow
As discussed in Section 1.1, a behavioral synthesis tool mainly has three phases:
front-end, scheduling and back-end. To build a scalable end-to-end formal equiva-
lence checking framework, we also partition our verification flow shown in Fig. 1.2
into the following three parts.
1. Front-end transformation checker checks the equivalence of the input and
output programs of each transformation applied. We use symbolic execution
techniques to explore paths of the input and output programs of each trans-
formation. We then check that under the same path condition, whether they
have the same observable behavior. Our incremental approach checks the
6front-end transformations by decomposing them into a sequence of checks,
one for each transformation applied. We identify two major sources to path
explosion problem in symbolic execution: subroutine calls and loops. We
propose a compositional checking approach to checking a design that con-
sists of a number of functions on a function-by-function basis, which greatly
reduces the checking complexity. We use cut-loop optimization to handle
path explosions introduced by loops.
2. Scheduling checker validates that 1) every operation in the design must be
scheduled to be executed, 2) control and data dependencies of the design
are preserved after scheduling, and 3) user specified timing constraints are
satisfied. We identify the properties need to be checked for different I/O
scheduling modes. and propose different algorithms to check the properties.
3. Back-end checker checks the equivalence of the scheduled design and the gen-
erated RTL. We symbolically simulate them cycle by cycle, and compare the
mapped variables (including inputs and outputs) at the end of each cycle.
Design and implementation optimizations employed either by the design-
ers or by the behavioral synthesis tool complicate the equivalence checking
problem. In particular, interface synthesis of global variables of a design and
operation gating are hurdles to the scalability of our checker. We use a com-
positional equivalence checking approach together with automatic inference
of the extended signature of each module to handle global variables. We pro-
pose a relaxed equivalence checking algorithm to tolerate local and irrelevant
in-equivalences introduced by operation gating. These two optimizations are
essential to make our checker scale to industrial-strength applications.
In addition to the three-phase equivalence checking framework, our deadlock
detection approach takes the design representation after scheduling transformation
and the result of interface synthesis, automatically generates assertions to capture
7deadlock conditions. The generated assertions can be used in assertion-based ver-
ification (simulation or formal verification tools) to detect deadlocks.
1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background
on behavioral synthesis, symbolic simulation and equivalence checking techniques
employed in hardware verification. In Chapter 3, we present our equivalence check-
ing framework for front-end compiler transformations in behavioral synthesis. We
also present several optimizations to handle the path explosion problem. In Chap-
ter 4, we present our validation approach to scheduling transformation, including
validation of control and data dependencies and I/O interface timing under differ-
ent scheduling modes. In Chapter 5, we present several optimizations to make our
back-end equivalence checker scale to industrial applications. We present an asser-
tion based verification approach to detecting deadlocks introduced by paralleliza-
tion of RTL blocks that are connected by synthesized interfaces with handshaking
protocols in Chapter 6. We conclude this dissertation research and discuss some
future research directions in Chapter 7.
8Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 BEHAVIORAL SYNTHESIS
Behavioral synthesis [26] provides a promising approach to dealing with the ever-
growing complexity in modern hardware design by generating high-quality RTL
implementations from high-level specifications. An early effort was made by re-
searchers at Carnegie Mellon University [51, 58] in the 1970s, which used instruc-
tion set processor specification as input language. There are open-source behavioral
synthesis tools from academia, e.g., SPARK [33], LegUp [17], and Bambu [1]. Com-
mercially available tools from major EDA (Electronic Design Automation) vendors
include Cadence’s C-to-Silicon Compiler [3], and Cynthesizer [5], Calypto’s Cata-
pult HLS [4], NEC’s Cyber Workbench [71], Synopsys’s Synphony C Compiler [67],
and Xilinx’s Vivado high-level synthesis [73]. Beside the above C based behavioral
synthesis tool, there are also tools use domain-specific input languages, e.g., HDL
Coder [52] from MathWorks generates portable, RTL code from MATLAB func-
tions or Simulink models. Bluespec [57] uses Bluespec SystemVerilog as input
language.
A behavioral synthesis tool takes an ESL behavioral description of a design (in
SystemC or C/C++), together with a library of hardware resources, and generates
an RTL implementation [20]. Similar to a compiler, a behavioral synthesis tool
first performs lexical, syntax and semantic analysis, and builds an intermediate
representation (IR) of the ESL description. A series of transformations is then
applied to the IR, which can be categorized into three phases.
9• Compiler transformations form the first phase. This includes transformations
such as dead code elimination, constant propagation, loop unrolling, etc.
• Scheduling transformations entail computing for each operation the clock cy-
cle for its execution. The clock cycle must account for constraints in hardware
resources as well as control and data flow. These transformations include
pipelining loops, grouping independent operations for concurrent execution,
etc.
• Resource binding and control synthesis map each operation to a hardware
functional unit, allocates registers for variables used across clock cycles, and
generates a finite state machine to implement the schedule.
After these transformations, the design can be represented in RTL. The RTL may
be subjected to further manual tweaks.
2.2 SYMBOLIC SIMULATION
Symbolic execution [43] is a technique that executes a program with symbolic
inputs instead of concrete ones. A symbolic program state includes a statement
counter, values of variables and a path condition. Since the inputs are symbolic,
the values of variables are expressions over symbolic inputs, and the path condition
is a Boolean expression over symbolic inputs. During the execution, a symbolic
execution tree is built, with each node representing a program state and each edge
representing a state transition condition.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates an example of symbolic execution of a simple program.
Fig. 2.1(a) shows a function foo written in C, and Fig. 2.1(b) shows its symbolic
execution tree. For simplicity, we only show the values of variables (in the box)
and path conditions (on the edge). At the beginning of the execution, variable x
and *f take symbolic value X and F, respectively. Function foo has two paths:
10
1 int foo(int *f, int x){
2 if(x>1) {
3 *f = *f + 1;
4 return 0;
5 } else {
6 *f = *f - 1;
7 return 1;
8 }
9 }
*f: F+1
 x: X
 r: 0
X>1 X≤1
*f: F-1
 x: X
 r: 1
*f: F
 x: X
 r: nil
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: A simple function foo in C with its symbolic execution tree. (a)
Function foo in C. (b) Symbolic execution tree of foo, where F and X are symbolic
values for *f and x, r denotes the return value, and nil denotes that the value is
not yet available.
one path increments f, and returns 0 with path condition X > 1; the other path
decrements f, and returns 1 with path condition X ≤ 1.
2.3 FORMAL EQUIVALENCE CHECKING
Formal equivalence checking techniques play an important role in EDA. After syn-
thesize an RTL design to a gate-level implementation, logic equivalence check-
ing tools are used to to prove that the gate-level implementation is function-
ally equivalent to the RTL design. With decades of research and development,
logic equivalence checking has become a mature field. Binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) [14] provide canonical representations for Boolean functions, early verifi-
cation efforts [50] use BDDs for formal logic verification. The idea is to convert
two Boolean functions into two BDDs, two functions are equivalent if they have
11
the same BDD representation. Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) is to check
whether a given propositional formula is satisfiable. There have been research on
using SAT for equivalence checking [32]. The basic idea is to convert the equiv-
alence of two circuits problem into satisfiability of a propositional formula, and
leverage the state-of-the-art SAT solver to solver the formula.
Our research leverages the success of logic equivalence checking. We borrow the
idea of logic equivalence checking of RTL designs and their gate-level implementa-
tions to check the equivalence of the high-level (C/C++) designs and the generated
RTL implementations in behavioral synthesis.
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Chapter 3
FRONT-END COMPILER TRANSFORMATION CHECKING
Behavioral synthesis tools apply a sequence of transformations to the input de-
sign before scheduling. We check front-end by decomposing it into a sequence of
checks, one for each transformation applied. The key observation is that even if the
transformation implementations may be closed-source, it is still possible to obtain
from most tools the IRs after application of each front-end transformation. Thus,
an sequential equivalence checking (SEC) methodology was developed to compare
each pair of consecutive IRs.
3.1 NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Let P be a program, V be the set of variables of P , and VO ⊆ V be the set of
observable variables. Intuitively, variables that we can observe during the execution
of P are called observable variables; we assume that the VO includes the input,
output, and global variables.
Definition 3.1 (State). A state s , {〈v, u〉 | v ∈ V, u is the value of v} of a
program P is the set of variables in P with their values.
Definition 3.2 (Observable State). An observable state sO at state s of a program
P , denoted by sO(s), is a projection of s, where variables in sO are restricted to
observable variables in program P .
Remark 3.1. We leave the domains for the values of variables undefined for this
presentation, but assume that they can be determined from the context. Also, we
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assume that the domain can be both concrete or symbolic; this permits us to use
the same notation for both concrete and symbolic states. For simplicity, we use
s[v] to denote the value, either concrete or symbolic, of variable v in state s.
Definition 3.3 (Path). A path pi , s0, c1, s1, c2, s2, . . . , cn, sn of a program is an
alternating sequence of states and state transition conditions, starting from an
initial state s0 and ending with a terminal state sn, where ci is the state transition
condition (Boolean expression over program variables) from si−1 to si for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
Definition 3.4 (Path Condition). Let pi , s0, c1, s1, c2, s2, . . . , sn−1, cn, sn be a
path of a program P . The path condition pc ,
∧n
i=1 ci of path pi is a conjunction
of all transition conditions on pi. We use pi[pc] to denote the path condition of pi.
Definition 3.5 (Path Compatibility). Given two programs S and T with the same
set of observable variables VO, let pi be a path of S with initial state s0 and path
condition pc, and pi′ be a path with initial state s′0 and path condition pc
′ of T .
We say pi and pi′ are compatible if sO(s0) = sO(s′0) and pc ∧ pc′ is satisfiable. Paths
pi and pi′ are called a compatible path pair of S and T .
Definition 3.6 (Path Equivalence). Let pi be a path of program S with terminal
state sn, and pi
′ be a path of program T with terminal state s′m, and suppose that
programs S and T have the same set of observable variables VO. We say path pi
and pi′ are equivalent, denoted by pi ∼ pi′, if pi and pi′ are compatible, and for each
variable v ∈ VO, sn[v] = s′m[v].
Informally, two paths are equivalent if they are compatible, and they have the
same observable state at their terminal states.
Definition 3.7 (Program Equivalence). Let S and T be two programs, we say
that program S and T are equivalent, denoted by S ∼ T , if every compatible path
pair of S and T has the same observable state at their terminal states. Formally let
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Figure 3.1: Framework of checking equivalence between program S and T , which
are the input and output of transformation T respectively.
Paths(S) and Paths(T ) be all paths of program S and T respectively, program S
and T are equivalent if for each path pi ∈ Paths(S) and every path pi′ ∈ Paths(T )
that is compatible with pi, pi is equivalent to pi′.
We define the correctness of a transformation by the equivalence of the observ-
able behavior of the source program S and the target program T . Informally S
and T are equivalent if fed the same inputs to both programs, they produce the
same output, and have the same effect on the environment (modification to global
variables) when terminating.
Definition 3.8 (Transformation Correctness). Let T be a transformation which
takes a source program S as input and produces a target program T as the output.
We say T is a correct transformation on program S if S ∼ T .
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3.2 EQUIVALENCE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
As shown in Fig. 3.1, suppose a transformation T takes a program S as input and
generates a program T as output. We validate the correctness of transformation
T when applied to S by checking whether T is equivalent to S. According to
Definition 3.7, we need to prove that S and T have the same observable state at
their terminal states for all compatible path pairs.
As a pedagogical simplification, assume that all the paths in S and T are enu-
merable. Also assume that S and T have the same function signature and global
variables; this assumption does not limit our approach because compiler transfor-
mations usually do not change function signature unless there are parameters that
are irrelevant or unused in the function body, which can be easily detected. Fi-
nally, assume that for each observable variable of S we can find the corresponding
variable for T and vice versa. We then proceed as follows. We assign the same
symbols to the input and non-constant global variables of S and T , then symboli-
cally execute them. After enumerating all paths of S and T , for each compatible
path pair pi in S and pi′ in T , we check whether pi and pi′ have the same observable
behavior; this check is done by an SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solver by
checking the equality between the symbolic expressions of the (symbolic) values of
the observable variables.
Algorithm 1 provides a high-level description of our approach. FunctionCheck-
Equivalence takes two programs S and T as arguments. Subroutine Symbol-
ize-Inputs creates symbols for inputs of S and T . Subroutine Sym-Exe symbol-
ically executes S with symbolic inputs, and collects all paths of S. For each path
pi with path condition pi[pc] of S, subroutine Get-Observable-State collects
the observable state sO corresponding to the terminal state in path pi. Subroutine
Sym-Exe symbolically executes T with the same symbolic inputs under condition
pi[pc], and collects all paths of T . Since all paths found in T are under the condition
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Algorithm 1: Check-Equivalence(S, T )
1 sI ← Symbolize-Inputs(S, T ) . Symbolize inputs
2 Π← Sym-Exe(S, sI , nil) . Symbolically Execute S
3 foreach pi ∈ Π do
4 sO ← Get-Observable-State(pi)
5 Π′ ← Sym-Exe(T, sI , pi[pc])
6 foreach pi′ ∈ Π′ do
7 s′O ← Get-Observable-State(pi′)
8 if not Cmp-State(sO, s
′
O, pi
′[pc]) then
9 print 〈sO, s′O〉 . Report inequivalences
10 return false
11 return true
pi[pc], therefore they are all compatible path with pi. For each path pi′ of T found
under the condition of pi[pc], subroutine Cmp-State checks if pi and pi′ have the
same observable state at termination. If the observable states are not equal, the
algorithm reports the inequivalences, otherwise it proceeds until all paths of S and
T are checked.
Fig. 2.1 and Fig.3.2 show two programs foo and bar which are defined in C and
their independent symbolic execution trees. Before execution, foo and bar have
the same symbolic input { 〈∗f, F〉 , 〈x, X〉 }, where F and X are symbolic values of
variables *f and x, respectively. Function foo has two paths, the final observable
states are { 〈∗f, F + 1〉 , 〈x, X〉 , 〈r, 0〉 } and { 〈∗f, F− 1〉 , 〈x, X〉 , 〈r, 1〉 }, with condi-
tions X > 1 and X ≤ 1, respectively. Similarly, the two final observable states of
function bar are { 〈∗f, F + 1〉 , 〈x, X〉 , 〈r, 1〉 } and { 〈∗f, F− 1〉 , 〈x, X〉 , 〈r, 1〉 }, with
conditions X > 3 and X ≤ 3, respectively.
Fig. 3.3 shows the symbolic execution tree when function bar is executed under
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1 int bar(int *f, int x){
2 if(x>3) {
3 *f = *f + 1;
4 return 1;
5 } else {
6 *f = *f - 1;
7 return 1;
8 }
9 }
*f: F+1
 x: X
 r: 1
X>3 X≤3
*f: F-1
 x: X
 r: 1
*f: F
 x: X
 r: nil
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: A simple function bar in C with its symbolic execution tree. (a)
Function bar in C. (b) Symbolic execution tree of bar, where F and X are symbolic
values for *f and x, r denotes the return value, and nil denotes that the value is
not yet available.
the path condition of function foo. In Fig. 3.3, state s0 is the initial state of
function foo, states s3 and s4 are the initial states of function bar, states s1 and
s2 are terminal states of foo, and states s5, s6 and s7 are terminal states of bar.
We need to conduct three equivalence checks:
• s1 vs. s5, where the return values are not equivalent;
• s1 vs. s6, where the values of *f are not equivalent, and return values are
also not equivalent;
• s2 vs. s7, the states are equivalent.
Therefore, our checking algorithm returns that foo and bar are not equivalent,
and reports the inequivalences.
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X>1 X≤1
X>3 1<X≤3 X≤1
foo
bar
s1
*f: F
 x: X
 r: nil
*f: F+1
 x: X
 r: 0
*f: F-1
 x: X
 r: 1
*f: F
 x: X
 r: nil
*f: F
 x: X
 r: nil
*f: F+1
 x: X
 r: 1
*f: F-1
 x: X
 r: 1
*f: F-1
 x: X
 r: 1
s0
s2
s4
s7
s3
s6s5
X>1 X≤1
Figure 3.3: Symbolic execution tree of function foo and bar, where bar is executed
after foo, and based on the execution condition of foo.
In summary, the above approach symbolically execute the two IRs (referred to
as S and T ) and check that each pair of corresponding program paths is equivalent.
A program path is uniquely specified by the sequence of branch conditions that
must hold for the control flow to execute the instructions in the path. The approach
was used on some cryptographic applications. Unfortunately, it does not scale to
other practical programs. In particular, it requires effective enumeration of all
paths in S and T ; in practice, this can lead to path explosion. Two key sources of
path explosion in practice are subroutine calls and loops. In the next two sections
we discuss optimizations to address these problems.
3.3 MODULAR REASONING ACROSS FUNCTIONS
Why do subroutine calls contribute to path explosion? The na¨ıve approach of
symbolically executing the program treats each function as if it were inlined: the
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function body is symbolically executed at each call site. When a function f having
a number of branches in its body (and hence program paths) is invoked many
times, each invocation contributes a multiplicative factor to the number of paths
explored.
Our approach to address this problem is to develop a compositional approach
to symbolic execution [31], which permits equivalence checking on a per-function
basis. Suppose functions f and f ′ invoke functions g and g′ respectively. Then
(1) we separately check the equivalence of g and g′; and (2) when checking the
equivalence of f and f ′, we replace g and g′ with the same uninterpreted function
symbols.
Of course the above na¨ıve scheme only works for side effect free functions. If g
and g′ update some global variables or pass-by-reference arguments, then replacing
g and g′ with the same uninterpreted function on the explicit arguments will be
unsound since the effect on the global variable or pass-by-reference arguments is
not accounted for. To address this, we use a notion of “extended signature”. The
idea is to extend the type signature of a function explicitly accounting for the side
effects. Let g be a sub-function; we use τ = g( ~αv, ~αr) to represent the signature of
g, where τ denotes the return value, ~αv denotes pass-by-value arguments, and ~αr
denotes pass-by-reference arguments. Then, in addition to the function arguments,
suppose function g reads globals ~βr and updates globals ~βw. The extended type
signature of g is:
〈τ, ~α′r, ~β′w〉 = g( ~αv, ~αr, ~βr),
where ~α′r and ~β′w are updated versions of ~αr and ~βw respectively, mimicking the
notion that they may be arbitrarily changed by function g. 1
Fig. 3.4 shows an example of a sub-function with side effects. Function f invokes
1Pass-by-reference arguments are pointers, and most behavioral synthesis tools restrict the
usage of pointers to compile-time determinable ones, which makes this approach works in finding
which variable a pointer points to.
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1 char A; // global variable
2 int B; // global variable
3 int C[2]; // global variable
4 void f(int d[4]) {
5 int i = 8;
6 g(i, d);
7 }
8 void g(int x, int y[4]) {
9 B = A + x; // side effect on global B
10 C[1] = C[0] + x; // side effect on global C
11 y[1] = y[0] + x; // side effect on arguments
12 }
Figure 3.4: Global variable usage with sub-function call example.
function g which updates the globals B and C, and pass-by-reference argument y.
Extended signatures are exploited to replace function calls with uninterpreted
functions symbols. Suppose that function g has been certified; when certifying
function f, we replace g with an uninterpreted function (say G) of four arguments,
and the effect of the invocation of g on the globals (B and C) and argument y is
given by:
〈d, B, C〉 = G(i, d, A, C).
Since each invocation of sub-functions is replaced by an uninterpreted function
symbol, we alleviate path-explosion problem introduced by subroutine calls. It
is worth noting that this can generate false alarms, and we need to take special
care to handle common false negatives. We discuss this issue when describing our
experiments.
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1 int f(int x) {
2 int i=0, sum=0;
3 int y = x + 100;
4 for(i=0; i<y; i++){
5 sum += i * 4;
6 }
7 return sum + x;
8 }
t1 := x + 100
t2 := ϕ [0, B1] [t7, B3]
t3 := ϕ [0, B1] [t6, B3]
t4 := t2 < t1
if  t4 goto B3
t8 := t3 + x
return t8
t5 := t2 × 4
t6 := t5 + t3
t7 := t2 + 1
B1
B2
B3B4
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: A simple function with a loop in C and its IR. (a) Function f has
an unbounded for loop. (b) The IR of f, with boxes representing basic blocks,
and arrows representing control flow. Control flow merge is implemented via φ-
instructions in basic block B2.
3.4 HANDLING LOOPS
Loops are the second major contributors to path explosion (and, in case of un-
bounded ones, non-termination) in symbolic simulation of software programs. The
reason is that symbolic simulation of a loop induces (at least) two branches for
each loop iteration simulated: (1) the branch where the loop test holds (and hence
the body is executed) and (2) the branch where the test is false.2
We handle equivalence of loops by an approach called cut-loop optimization.
Our approach borrows ideas from a corresponding one for back-end SEC between
high-level IR and RTL [36], and is an adaptation of classic inductive assertions
2The branching may be limited if the value of the loop test can be computed concretely
during symbolic execution of the loop. However, this is not possible for most non-trivial loops in
practice.
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approach [29, 38] to program equivalences. The idea is to “cut” the loop, which
reduces equivalence of loop execution to equivalence checks at entry, body, and
exit. To illustrate the idea, consider the example in Fig. 3.5. Fig. 3.5 (a) shows a
simple unbounded loop in C. Fig. 3.5 (b) shows the IR of function f.3 If the input
x is symbolic, then the symbolic expansion of the loop (and hence the symbolic
execution of f) will not terminate.4 We assume loops are in natural loop form in
the IRs. A natural loop must have a single entry point (header) and at least one
back edge leading the control flow from the loop body back to the loop header.
Fig. 3.5 (b) is an example of a natural loop, where B2 is the loop header, and edge
(B3, B2) is the back edge.
Back-end SEC [36] exploits mappings of variables provided by behavioral syn-
thesis tool. For simplicity, suppose each basic block is a scheduling step in Fig. 3.5 (b).
At the end of execution of each scheduling step, we check the equivalence of all
mapped variables. If they are equivalent, we replace every pair of mapped vari-
ables with the same symbolic symbol (with cut-point optimization). Suppose the
loop is entered from B1, after executing of B3, variables t5, t6 and t7 are checked
equivalence with their mapped variables in RTL, and then will be replaced with
symbolic variables. Till this point, we checked the first iteration of the loop. The
subsequent iterations of the loop are all led by the back edge. Since we made t5,
t6 and t7 symbolic, executing the subsequent iterations once will cover all possible
cases. All we need to do is to avoid multiple entrance of a loop through the same
back edge.
3Control flow merge is implemented via φ-instructions in basic block B2. A φ-instruction v
= φ [α, Bi] [β, Bj ] in basic block B means that v has the value α if B is reached from Bi, and β
if reached from Bj .
4Technically, symbolic simulation can terminate when a fixpoint is reached, i.e., when all
reachable states have been explored. But achieving such fixpoint requires the restriction that
all the variable types are finite, as well as an expensive fixpoint computation through symbolic
simulation.
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However, variables mappings between two IRs are not available during front-
end transformations. Suppose a loop consists of a list of basic blocks; then we
must identify a minimum set of variables that need to be mapped between the two
IRs. In particular, we need to identify mappings for loop-carried variables. The
reason is that we want to make them symbolic, so that we only need to execute
the loop once through each back edge (see below).
We achieve the above through use-definition chains analysis [10]. In the ex-
ample shown in Fig. 3.5 (b), loop L consists of basic blocks B2 and B3, variable
t6 and t7 are loop-carried variables. For example, execution of loop L is done as
follows:
1. Loop L is entered from B1:
• path 1: B1 → B2 → B4: we check the equivalence of return variable t8;
• path 2: B1 → B2 → B3: we check the equivalence of loop-carried
variables t6 and t7, and make them symbolic afterwards.
2. Loop L is entered from B3 through the back edge:
• path 1: B3 → B2 → B4: we check the equivalence of return variable t8;
• path 2: B3 → B2 → B3: we check the equivalence of loop-carried
variables t6 and t7, and terminate L.
The above approach requires detecting the loop structure (e.g., loop header,
exit, back edge, etc.) in the IRs. Once the loop-carried variables are identified,
equivalence of loop computation can be verified by checking the first iteration
(entered from entry) and one subsequent symbolic iteration (entered through back
edge) for each back edge; since we made loop-carried variables symbolic after first
iteration, this covers all possible cases for the subsequent iterations. The sufficiency
of these checks was mechanically proven in previous work using the ACL2 theorem
prover [63].
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Finally, cut-loop requires that when the corresponding loops in the two IRs be-
ing compared have the same structure, and perform equivalent computation at each
iteration, e.g., it is inapplicable if the transformation entails partial loop unrolling.
However, as our experiments indicate, most behavioral synthesis transformations
are structure-preserving, making the optimization widely applicable.
3.5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 3.1: Summary of CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Checking of Front-
end Compiler Transformations
App. Domain Design Lines of C Code Lines of RTL # of Functions
Arithmetic DFADD 542 12933 17
DFDIV 452 10948 19
DFMUL 392 7100 16
DFSIN 772 22949 31
Microprocessor MIPS 256 7237 1
Media Processing ADPCM 521 33706 15
GSM 388 22816 12
JPEG 1031 53584 30
MOTION 414 13770 13
Security AES 699 40014 11
BLOWFISH 1241 23490 6
SHA 1284 12491 8
We applied our framework to CHStone [37], a publicly available behavioral
synthesis benchmark suite containing 12 ESL designs (in C). We used LegUp [17]
to synthesize these designs. We conducted our experiments on a workstation with
Debian 7.1 running on a 2.93 GHz Intel Xeon X3470 processor with 8 GB of
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Table 3.2: Summary of Evaluation on CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Check-
ing of Front-end Compiler Transformations
Design # of Checked
Transformations
# of Successful
Checks
Success
Rate (%)
Avg.
Time (s)
Memory
(MB)
DFADD 62 62 100.00 0.78 159.86
DFDIV 62 78 79.49 0.95 161.22
DFMUL 47 48 97.92 0.93 155.93
DFSIN 113 115 98.26 0.88 187.70
MIPS 10 13 76.92 2.32 15.01
ADPCM 69 101 68.32 3.33 123.85
GSM 53 86 61.63 0.26 122.94
JPEG 158 237 66.67 1.55 694.76
MOTION 59 74 79.73 0.49 52.50
AES 67 85 78.82 4.22 120.56
BLOWFISH 27 48 56.25 3.28 93.58
SHA 36 61 59.02 0.05 106.14
memory. We focused on intra-procedural transformations. The experiments were
run with a cutoff time of 90 seconds: certifications taking longer than this time
are classified as failures. The reason for this cutoff is that in our experience,
most successful transformation certifications that complete in any reasonable time
finish within a few seconds of this size; if symbolic execution takes more than 90
seconds, it is unlikely to finish. Thus we believe that the impact of making the
cutoff longer on the number of successful transformations will be insignificant. Our
tool supports a number of SMT solvers. The results on this benchmark use Z3 [24]
since it outperforms others.
Table 3.1 and 3.2 show the statistics of the experiments, e.g., the number
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of success rate on designs of CHStone benchmark without
and with cut-loop optimization. The x axis is ordered by the success rate with
cut-loop.
of transformations applied by the synthesis tool,5 the number of transformations
checked successfully, as well as time and memory usages. In all successful cases,
time and memory usages are modest. With compositional execution and cut-loop
optimization, we successfully validated 75.69 percent of transformations (763 out
of 1008).
Fig. 3.6 compares the success without and with cut-loop optimization. Without
cut-loop, we can validate only 52.88 percent of transformations (533 out of 1008).
Cut-loop optimization provides an improvement of 22 percent. The improvement
is most significant for AES, JPEG, GSM, and BLOWFISH since they have more loops.
The transformations that fail certification (about 25 percent) typically do so for
5Some transformations are applied more than once.
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two reasons: (1) the transformation changes loop structure thus makes cut-loop
inapplicable; or (2) symbolic expressions of corresponding variables in source and
target programs become too complex, causing blow-up of the SMT solver.
Since we focus on intra-procedural transformations, we check the designs com-
positionally; this may sometimes introduce subtle false alarms. False alarms can
arise in surprising ways, e.g., the extended signature of a sub-function is different
in the source and target programs. As an example 6, suppose that a function foo
has a sub-function legup memcpy that is invoked as follows.
r = legup memcpy(a, b, c)
This sub-function has a return value, but the value is never used subsequently.
Similarly, suppose that a function bar invokes the same sub-function legup memcpy
as follows:
legup memcpy(a, b, c)
This invocation treats legup memcpy as if it returns void. The problem is when we
compositionally check foo and bar, we abstract sub-function legup memcpy with
uninterpreted function. Since the extended signatures are different for two invoca-
tions of the sub-function, (one with a return value and the other one without), a
na¨ıve approach will report an inequivalence due to type mismatch. Since the result
of return value r in foo is not used, this inequivalence is a false alarm. However,
it can be easily eliminated, by excluding from the extended signature the types of
return values that are not subsequently used.
3.6 RELATED WORK
Formal verification of compilers: There has been research on formally prov-
ing compiler transformations correct by theorem prover. CompCert [49] is the
6This is a real example in function Fill Buffer in MOTION design. The transformation is
called “Combine Redundant Instructions”
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first formally verified compiler. Similar to CompCert, Vellvm [76] project formal-
izes LLVM’s intermediate representation, and develops a framework for reasoning
about programs. Ray et al. proposed an certification framework for transforma-
tions in behavioral synthesis [64]. This framework uses theorem proving to certify
high-level transformations. However, using theorem proving to prove all transfor-
mations requires enormous manual effort; it also requires knowledge about internal
algorithms of each transformation, which is often not available because most be-
havioral synthesis tools are closed source.
Translation validation: Pnueli et al. proposed the notion of translation valida-
tion [59] for validating the transformations during compilation. Instead of verifying
a transformation once and for all, they showed how to generate a proof of correspon-
dence between the source and target programs for each individual transformation.
However, it is problematic for the approach to handle programs with more than
one loop. Zuck et al. extended this approach to support structure-modifying trans-
formations [77]. Necula used symbolic evaluation techniques from proof-carrying
code to tackle translation validation [56]. However, this approach only handled
transformations where source and target programs have the same branch condi-
tions. Zaks and Pnueli proposed a framework to construct the cross product of the
source and target programs [75]. This reduces the problem of checking the equiv-
alence of two programs to verification of a single program. Peggy [69] performed
translation validation for the LLVM compiler using equality saturation. It built
Program Expression Graphs for the source and target programs of a transforma-
tion and then reasons about equalities among graph nodes. If output nodes of two
programs are shown equal, the two programs are equivalent. To our knowledge,
these approaches do not scale to programs of the size we consider in this research.
Note that a key reason for the differences in scalability is that the aim of the above
line of research is to check the correctness of generic compiler transformations
while we focus on the transformations in behavioral synthesis. In particular, the
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programs being synthesized can be represented as finite state machines and many
language features such as dynamic memory allocation are prohibited.
Symbolic execution based techniques: There has also been recent research
on applying symbolic techniques to checking the equivalence of two arbitrary pro-
grams. uc-klee [62] proposes a smart stub function that invokes two routines
that need to be verified for equivalence, and leverages klee [15] to symbolically
execute the stub function. Upon finding a path, uc-klee checks if the two rou-
tines behave the same. uc-klee enumerates path with best efforts; thus it suffers
from path explosion and does not terminate when executing unbounded loops.
sym-diff [48] is a symbolic differentiation tool, which symbolically executes two
programs with same symbolic inputs, and checks if the two programs have identi-
cal outputs. sym-diff handles loops by unrolling them to a user-specified depth;
consequently it cannot certify equivalence between programs whose loops itera-
tions are long or controlled by input variables; we can handle such programs with
cut-loop optimization.
3.7 SUMMARY
In this Chapter, we have presented a scalable SEC framework to validate the cor-
rectness of front-end compiler transformations in behavioral synthesis. We use
symbolic execution technique to explore (possibly all) paths of the source and tar-
get programs of each transformation. We showed how to ameliorate path explosion
and non-termination in symbolic simulation through compositionality and cut-loop
optimization. Our framework can fully automatically certify results of more than
75 percent of 1008 transformations employed by a synthesis tool on designs from
the CHStone benchmark. We are not aware of any SEC framework that can handle
compiler transformations at such diversity and scale.
Our results underline the importance of aligning verification methodology with
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the design flow in the development of a scalable verification framework. SEC for
behavioral synthesis transformations at the scale achieved here has not been done
before because extant tools focused on input/output equivalence between the high-
level ESL description and synthesized RTL; such efforts are ineffective because of
the high abstraction gap. On the other hand, pre-certified compiler transforma-
tion via theorem proving as proposed in previous work [64] was not successful
both because of the number and complexity of such transformations and the reluc-
tance of synthesis tool vendors to expose transformation implementation for formal
analysis. Our key insights are that (1) design IRs before and after each transfor-
mation application can be made available from a commercial synthesis flow even
if the transformations themselves are proprietary, and (2) restrictions in program
features enforced by behavioral synthesis from the need to eventually generate
hardware circuit from the design description make it possible to use “black-box”
SEC techniques effectively to certify these IRs. The key take-away from our paper
is that once the right verification methodology has been identified, it is possible
with insight of the source of verification complexity of the domain to adapt well-
known analysis ingredients into an end-to-end certification solution in a complex
domain.
One possible argument against our framework is the requirement that IRs after
each transformation application be available to the tool. In particular, if the
validation is performed by a third party, this requirement may provide exposure
to confidential design intellectual property (IP). In practice, we have not seen that
to be a problem for two reasons. First, in many industrial contexts, the validation
is performed by personnel who have access to the original ESL and RTL designs
anyhow (e.g., by a validation group in the same organization that designed the
ESL). Second, most extant commercial behavioral synthesis tools already provide
the information on IRs; we do not require any additional information to perform
our analysis. Nevertheless, the potential of IP leakage is an important one, and we
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plan to look at the constraints and data available to third-party evaluators during
design certification in future work to determine how our framework can be made
usable in that context.
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Chapter 4
VALIDATING SCHEDULING TRANSFORMATION
4.1 SCHEDULING TRANSFORMATION
Scheduling is a critical synthesis phase that directly affect the quality of synthe-
sized design in terms of timing, performance, and thermal characteristics [22].
Scheduling transformation involves complex heuristics to ensure that the design
being synthesized can meet the timing and resource constraints while preserving
control and data dependencies.
To understand the source of resource constraints consider scheduling the fol-
lowing operations:
S1: x = y * z;
S2: p = x + y;
S3: w = a * b;
S4: q = a + z;
Assume that the design is not being pipelined, the system has a single multiplier
that requires 3 cycles for completion, and two adders. Suppose the scheduling
transformation schedules S1 to start at clock cycle t. Then, since there is data
dependency between S1 and S2, the operation S2 cannot be scheduled before t.
Furthermore, since multiplier takes 3 clock cycles, S2 cannot be scheduled to start
before cycle t+3. Finally, since there is only one multiplier, S3 cannot be scheduled
to start before cycle t+3 either, although there is no data dependency between S1
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1 void block::thread() {
2 int accu = 0;
3 wait();
4 while(1) {
5 int a = In.read();
6 Out.write(a + accu);
7 wait();
8 int b = In.read();
9 Out.write(b * b);
10 accu = In.read();
11 wait();
12 }
13 }
Figure 4.1: An example of a SystemC thread, which has two superstates in the
while loop.
and S3 (or S3 is scheduled at clock cycle t, then S1 can not be scheduled before
cycle t + 3). On the other hand, since there are two adders, S2 and S4 can be
scheduled concurrently.
For untimed C/C++ designs, scheduling transformation can assign any clock
cycle to an I/O operation as long as control/data dependencies and resource con-
straints as discussed above are met. However, most high-level descriptions of hard-
ware designs also specify partial timing. For example, SystemC designs can have
default I/O timing constraints that are usually specified by wait statements. Be-
havioral synthesis tools usually provide the user the flexibility to explore different
architectures by picking different I/O scheduling modes [26] as discussed below.
1. Cycle-Fixed mode: In this mode, the user explicitly specifies the timing of
the I/O operations, and the scheduling transformation cannot change or
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Figure 4.2: Cycle-fixed and superstate-fixed scheduling mode for the while loop
in thread in Fig. 4.1.
refine this timing. This is applied typically at design interfaces which imple-
ment communication protocols (possibly with other external interfaces), and
the cycles when data must be read or written is governed by the protocol.
Fig. 4.2 shows an example of cycle-fixed scheduling for the thread in Fig. 4.1.
Note that the number of states is 2, which is the same as the design before
scheduling.
2. Superstate-Fixed mode: In this mode, the user specifies wait statements.
The scheduler comprehends these wait statements to be the boundaries of
“superstates”, which impose constraints on scheduling I/O operations as fol-
lows. Informally, a superstate is a sequence of operations, possibly scheduled
over multiple clock cycles, with the requirements that (1) no I/O operation
in a superstate can be moved across the superstate boundary, and (2) all I/O
writes must be scheduled at the last clock cycle assigned to operations in the
superstate. Fig. 4.2 shows an example of its use for thread in Fig. 4.1. Here
we assume that the multiplication takes two cycles, we can see that the read
in line 10 and the write in line 9 are scheduled to the third clock cycle.
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3. Free-Floating mode: The scheduling transformation can assign any I/O op-
eration to any clock cycle (possibly switching their program order), even add
or delete clock cycles, as long as control/data dependencies are maintained.
4.2 FORMALIZATION
In order to formalize the validation requirement to certify scheduling transforma-
tions, we need a notion of correspondence between IRs before and after scheduling.
In this section, we develop the formalization of this notion. Note that the notion
we require for certifying a specific scheduling application depends on the scheduling
mode for the application.
Assumptions and Conventions. Our notion of correspondence relates execu-
tions of IRs before and after scheduling. Consequently, it depends on a formal
semantics of IRs. Our formalization uses the Control/Data Flow Graph (CDFG)
defined below. It is widely used as design representations in research on compiler
and intermediate languages. Our formalization assumes that (1) the set Vo of oper-
ations in an IR is a subset of a fixed set O of all operations; and (2) all operations
in O are defined through operational semantics over abstract machine states. We
also assume the IR to be naturally decomposed into a collection of basic blocks
Vb. These assumptions are standard in formalization of control constructs for pro-
gramming language semantics. Furthermore, O is assumed to contain standard
variable read and write operations with the usual meaning, and a wait operation
that specifies a transition in the operational model with no effect on the under-
lying machine state. Given a set V of operations, we define the active subset of
V , denoted by V [N ] to be the subset of V excluding all wait statements. Finally,
we restrict operations in O to be in Single Static Assignment (SSA) form. This is
also standard for IRs generated by compiler transformation, e.g., LLVM imposes
this restriction. Consequently, for each operation o ∈ Vo there is a unique basic
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block in Vb containing o. Control and data flows are determined by data depen-
dencies via usual read-after-write paradigm: for o1, o2 ∈ O, o2 depends on o1 if
(1) o1 appears before o2 in the program order, and (2) o2 reads the value of some
variable written by o1. Following conventions from program analysis, the control
flow graph of an IR is a directed graph GC , (Vb, Ec) where an edge e ∈ Ec from
basic block b0 to b1 represents a control dependency of b1 on b0, and the data flow
graph is the directed graph GD , (Vo, Ed) where an edge e ∈ Ed from operation o1
to o2 represents a data dependency of o2 on o1. For convenience we assume that
for any wait operation w and any write operation o preceding w in the IR, there
is an edge from o to w in GD; correspondingly, for any read or write operation o
′
following w, there is an edge from w to o′.
Definition 4.1 (CDFG). The CDFG is a triple G , (GC , GD, R), where Gc ,
(Vb, Ec) is a control flow graph, GD , (Vo, Ed) is a data flow graph, and R is a
mapping R : Vo → Vb.
Informally, for each operation o ∈ Vo, R(o) represents the basic block for o.
The mapping is well-defined by the uniqueness assumption.
The goal of scheduling transformation is to assign to each operation a clock
cycle of execution. For this paper, we assume that the set of operations does not
change due to scheduling, and the control/data flow remains unaffected. This is
justified since operations are typically modified by compiler transformation before
scheduling, which can be certified through a separate equivalence checking tech-
nique as achieved by previous work [74]. Furthermore, control and data flow in
behavioral synthesis are typically modified by either compiler transformations or
pipelining, which can also be separately certified [34].
We formalize the timing associated with an operation execution with the notion
of a state transition partition (STP) defined below. In the following definition, it
is convenient to interpret the pair (Pi, τi) as the directive that (active) operations
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in Pi are scheduled at clock cycle τi.
Definition 4.2 (STP). Let Vo be a set of operations. A state transition partition
of Vo is a finite set of pairs {(Pi, τi) : i = 1 . . . k}, where each Pi is a sequence of
operations over Vo[N ] and the following conditions hold:
1.
⋃k
i=1 Pi = Vo[N ];
2. Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for i 6= j;
3. τi ∈ N with τi 6= τj for i 6= j.
If the pair (P, τ) is a member of STP S then for any operation o ∈ P we
represent τ as τS[o] and P as PS[o], dropping the subscript when there is no
ambiguity.
STP can be viewed as a grouping of active operations in Vo by associating
them to a clock cycle for execution. Note that each partition is specified as a
sequence rather than a set. The reason is that due to control/data dependencies
one cannot execute all the operations together even if all of them can be completed
(perhaps sequentially) within one clock cycle. It is convenient to view each par-
tition Pi as a sequence requiring that if an operation o appears before o
′ then o′
cannot be scheduled for execution before o. We utilize this restriction in defining
trace compatibility below, which relates operations in STP with the control/data
flow requirements specified by a CDFG. Informally, we want that the operation
scheduling must respect the data and control dependencies in the CDFG, i.e., an
operation o can be scheduled at cycle τ only after any operations o depends on
have completed, either in a previous cycle or earlier in the same cycle.
Definition 4.3 (Operation Precedence). Given an STP S over a set of operations
Vo, and two operations o1, o2 ∈ Vo, we say o2 follows o1 in Vo if either (1) τ [o2] >
τ [o1], or (2) τ [o1] = τ [o2] and o2 appears after o1 in P [o1].
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Definition 4.4 (Trace Compatibility). Let G , (GC , GD, R) be a CDFG over the
set of operations Vo and basic blocks Vb, and let S , {(P, τ)} be an STP over Vo.
We say that S is compatible with G is the following conditions hold for each pair
of operations oi and oj in Vo[N ]:
1. If there is a path from oi to oj in GD then then oj follows oi in S.
2. If there is a path from R(oi) to R(oj) in GC then oj follows oi in S.
In addition to respecting control/data flow requirements from CDFG specified
by the definition of Trace Compatibility, scheduling must also satisfy the I/O
restrictions as specified by the scheduling mode. Formally, we capture the I/O
restrictions for each scheduling mode by further restricting for I/O operations the
timing constraints.
The most “rigid” scheduling mode is cycle-fixed. We formalize its requirement
in the following definition. Informally, the definition requires that the I/O opera-
tions be scheduled strictly following the timing constraints specified by the user.
Definition 4.5 (Valid Cycle-Fixed Schedule). Let S , {(Pi, τi), i = 1, . . . , k} over
an operation set Vo and G , (GC , GD, R) be a CDFG. We say that P is a valid
cycle-fixed schedule with respect to G if S is compatible with G, and the following
additional condition holds:
Let o1 and o2 be two read or write operations such that R(o1) = R(o2).
Suppose that there is a path Π in GD from o1 to o2 that has n wait
operations. Then τ [o2] = τ [o1] + n.
The scheduling requirements for the superstate-fixed mode are the most elab-
orate. We formalize them below.
Definition 4.6 (Valid Superstate-Fixed Schedule). Let S , {(Pi, τi), i = 1, . . . , k}
over an operation set Vo and G , (GC , GD, R) be a CDFG. We say that P is a
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valid superstate-fixed schedule with respect to G if S is compatible with G, and
additional timing conditions hold which are specified as follows. Let oi and oj be
two read or write operations such that R(oi) = R(oj). Suppose that there is a
path Π in GD from oi to oj that has n wait operations. Then τ [oj] ≥ τ [oi] + n. In
addition, let o1, o2, o3 be operations such that R(o1) = R(o2) = R(o3), o1 and o2
are write operations, and o3 is a wait operation. Suppose that there are paths Π1
and Π2 in GD from o1 to o3 and o2 to o3 such that there is no intermediate wait
operation. Then:
1. P [o1] = P [o2].
2. Let o be any operation such that R(o) = R(o1) and there is a path Π from o
to o1 (resp., o2) in GD. Then τ [o] ≤ τ [o1] (resp., τ [o] ≤ τ [o2]).
3. Let o be any operation such that either (1) there is a path Π from o1 (resp.,
o2) to o in GD, or (2) there is a path Π
′ from R(o1) to R(o) in GC (resp.,
o2). Then τ [o1] ≤ τ [o] and τ [o2] ≤ τ [o].
We ensure that the scheduling does not “squeeze” I/O operations by removing
clock cycles. In addition, conditions 1 – 3 ensure that any write operation is
scheduled in the last before any user-provided wait operation. Note that unlike
the cycle-fixed mode, scheduling can introduce additional wait operations in this
mode, thereby “stretching” operation scheduling to more cycles than specified by
user-provided wait operations.
Finally, for free-floating mode, since there is no additional restriction on I/O
operations, a valid schedule is one that satisfies Trace Compatibility.
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4.3 VALIDATION APPROACH
4.3.1 Validating Trace Compatibility
Let G be the CDFG of a design and S be the STP after scheduling for a set Vo of
operations. Our approach to control/data dependency checking (and hence free-
floating mode scheduling) is to first define a dependency graph G∆, consolidating
the control and data dependencies. The dependency graph G∆ = (V∆, E∆) where
V∆ is a set of operations, E∆ is a tuple 〈oi, oj, C〉, which is interpreted to mean
that operation oj depends on oi under condition C. Condition C is a conjunction
of Boolean variables. Note that dependency graph G∆ not only captures the
data dependencies of a design, but also includes control dependencies through the
condition encoded in each edge. Constructing the graph requires a traversal of
CDFG G, identifying for each operation o ∈ Vo, the condition under which o is
executed. This can be done efficiently using def-use chain analysis [10], exploiting
the SSA form of the operations: since the left-hand-side of every assignment is
unique we can trivially identify variable dependency chains. Finally, to check if
the control/data dependencies are satisfied in S, it is sufficient that for each pair
of operations oi and oj, oj follows oi in S under condition C.
According to Definition 4.4, S is compatible with G if control and data depen-
dencies are preserved in S. Therefore we can validate the trace compatibility by
comparing the dependency graphs of S and G.
4.3.2 Validating I/O Timing
The I/O timing is important for partially timed designs (e.g. wait statements ex-
plicitly specified in SystemC). Even for untimed C/C++ designs, some behavioral
synthesis tools allow the user to specify a protocol region of design to instruct the
scheduling transformation to preserve the timing of the I/Os within the region.
Within the protocol region, the scheduling transformation will not re-order the
41
void dut::my_thread() {
  initialize();
  while( true ) {
    wait();
    a = 1;
    if(x) {
      wait();
      b = a + 1;
    } else {
      wait();
      c = a + b;
      wait();
      d = c + 1;
    }
  }
}
s0
s1
s2 s3
s4
(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: Extract superstates of a thread in SystemC. (a) my thread is a thread
of module dut, wait statements are the boundary of superstates in SystemC. (b)
Superstates and their transitions of my thread.
I/O operations, and will not insert wait statements. The wait statements specify
the boundary of superstates.
For Cycle-Fixed and Superstate-Fixed modes, we need to additionally validate
the I/O timing requirements. In order to check the timing requirements, it will be
convenient to call the partitions in the STP S to be states and the set of operations
between any two user-specified wait operations in a CDFG G to be superstates.
Fig. 4.3 (a) shows an example of a module dut in SystemC, where my thread
is a thread of dut. Fig. 4.3 (b) shows the superstates and their transitions in
my thread.
Let an execution trace pi = [ss1, s
s
2, . . . , s
s
i , . . .] of a CDFG G , (GC , GD, R) be
a sequence execution of superstates following control flow in GC . Let an execution
trace pi′ = [sg1, s
g
2, . . . , s
g
j , . . .] of an STP S be a sequence of operation segments,
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Algorithm 2: Check-Cycle-Fixed-Mode(G, S)
1 ss← Build-Superstates(G)
2 T1 ← Compute-Traces(ss)
3 T2 ← Compute-Traces(S)
4 foreach pi = [ss1, s
s
2, . . . , s
s
m] ∈ T1 do
5 C ← Extract-Trace-Cond(pi)
6 [sg1, s
g
2, . . . , s
g
n]← Find-Trace(T2, C)
7 assert m = n . have the same number of cycles
8 for i← 0 to m do
9 assert Has-1-1-Mapping(Frw(ssi ), Frw(sgi ))
10 return true
such that operations in each segment belong to the same partition. Note that
traces pi and pi′ can be infinite due to loops structures. Since we have already
checked the control and data dependencies of G and S in Section 4.3.1, we know
the loop structures are preserved by the scheduling transformation. Thus, when
computing the traces of G and S, we can break loop back-edges temporarily. As a
result, traces in G and S will be finite.
Let Frw be a projection function, which takes a superstate ssi or operation
segment sgi , outputs only read and write operations. Similarly, let Fw be another
projection function, which only outputs write operations.
We are now ready to formally specify our algorithm for Cycle-Fixed and Superstate-
Fixed modes:
From the requirements of Cycle-Fixed mode, the number of superstates after
scheduling must be equal to the number of scheduled states. Algorithm 2 checks
if STP S is a valid Cycle-Fixed scheduling of CDFG G. Function Build-Super-
states build superstates ss from G. The superstates can be obtained easily by
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traversing G in a depth-first search manner while accumulating operations. A new
superstate is built when we encounter a wait operation. Then function Com-
pute-Traces computes all traces in ss and S. Note that we temporarily break
loop back-edges, therefore there will be finite number of traces for ss and S. For
each trace pi ∈ T1, functions Extract-Trace-Cond and Find-Trace will pair
up traces in ss and S according to the trace condition C. We assert that each
paired traces should be executed in the same number of cycles, and within each
cycle, function Has-1-1-Mapping checks that I/O operations have one-to-one
mappings between each superstate ssi and operation segment s
g
i . If there are no
assertion failures after checking all traces, Algorithm 2 returns true, meaning that
STP S is a valid Cycle-Fixed scheduling of CDFG G.
Algorithm 3: Check-Superstate-Fixed-Mode(G, S)
1 ss← Build-Superstates(G)
2 T1 ← Compute-Traces(ss)
3 T2 ← Compute-Traces(S)
4 foreach pi = [ss1, s
s
2, . . . , s
s
m] ∈ T1 do
5 C ← Extract-Trace-Cond(pi)
6 pi′ = [sg1, s
g
2, . . . , s
g
n]← Find-Trace(T2, C)
7 start← 0
8 for i← 0 to m do
9 end← Find-Shortest-Segments(pi′, start, ssi )
10 seg ← [sgstart, . . . , sgend]
11 assert Has-1-1-Mapping(Frw(ssi ), Frw(seg))
12 assert Has-1-1-Mapping(Fw(ssi ), Fw(sgend))
13 start← end+ 1
14 return true
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Algorithm 3 checks if STP S is a valid Superstate-Fixed scheduling of CDFG
G. Similarly, the algorithm computes the traces of G and S. Each superstate may
be “stretched” into multiple state after scheduling. For each trace pair pi ∈ T1 and
pi′ ∈ T2, we use function Find-Shortest-Segments to find the corresponding
trace segments that were “stretched” from a particular superstate. Function Find-
Shortest-Segments(pi′, start, ssi ) finds the trace segments seg = s
g
start, . . . , s
g
end
with minimum length which starts from start and ends at end, such that Fio(ssi ) ⊆
Fio(seg). We then assert that I/O operations have one-to-one mappings between
each ssi and trace segments seg, which means that all I/O operations are within
the bound of the superstate. We finally assert that write operations have one-
to-one mappings between ssi and trace segment s
g
end (the last segment in seg),
which means that all write operations within a superstate are scheduled to the
last “stretches” state.
4.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 4.1: Summary of Evaluation on S2CBench Benchmark
App. Domain Design Lines of C Lines of RTL # Processes. # Functions. Time (s)
Security AES CIPHER 429 3941 1 11 8.89
KASUMI 415 3602 2 5 0.44
MD5C 467 4105 1 7 9.72
SONW 3G 522 3121 1 11 1.54
Media Proc. QSORT 204 865 1 1 0.07
SOBEL 269 1191 1 2 0.15
ADPCM 270 370 1 3 0.05
FIR 176 561 1 2 0.07
DECIMATION 422 3267 1 1 9.14
INTERPOLATION 231 1721 1 1 0.18
IDCT 450 4266 2 2 1.08
DISPARITY 634 4355 4 4 9.06
We have implemented our scheduling validation algorithms in OCaml. We
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1 void block::thread() {
2 int accu = 0;
3 wait();
4 while(1) {
5 Out.write(a);
6 Out.write(a+1);
7 wait();
8 }
9 }
1 void block::thread() {
2 int accu = 0;
3 wait();
4 while(1) {
5 Out.write(a);
6 add state(); // an extra cy
cle is added
7 Out.write(a+1);
8 wait();
9 }
10 }
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: An example of incorrect scheduling of signal I/O. (a). Design before
scheduling, where a signal output Out is written twice with different values, how-
ever, only the last write is visible and valid. (b). The design after scheduling,
where two writes of Out are scheduled to two different cycles. For simplicity, we
use function add state() to represent the scheduling transformation will add a
new state on that line.
applied scheduling validation algorithms to designs from S2CBench [66], which is a
publicly available behavioral synthesis benchmark suite containing 13 ESL designs
written in synthesizable SystemC. The designs were synthesized by a commercial
synthesis tool. We conducted our experiments on a workstation with Debian 7.1
running on a 2.93 GHz Intel Xeon X3470 processor with 8 GB of memory. Table 4.1
shows the statistics of the experiments. We can validate each of the 12 designs
within 10 seconds. In the benchmark, the FFT design is not shown, because the
floating point data type in it is not accepted by the synthesis tool.
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1 void block::thread2() {
2 var = 0; // var is a variable
3 Out.write(0); // output
4 sig.write(0); // sig is a signal
5 wait();
6 while(1) {
7 var ++;
8 sig.write(var);
9 sc_uint<16> j = sig.read();
10 Out.write(j);
11 wait();
12 }
13 }
1 void block::thread2() {
2 var = 0; // var is a variable
3 Out.write(0); // output
4 sig.write(0); // sig is a signal
5 wait();
6 while(1) {
7 var ++;
8 sig.write(var);
9 add state(); // an extra cycle
is added
10 sc_uint<16> j = sig.read();
11 Out.write(j);
12 wait();
13 }
14 }
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5: An example of incorrect scheduling of signal I/O. (a). Design before
scheduling, where a local signal sig is written and then read at the same cycle.
The read statement takes the old value. (b). The design after scheduling, where
the write and read statements are scheduled to two different cycles, then the read
takes the new value. For simplicity, we use function add state() to represent the
scheduling transformation will add a new state on that line.
SystemC allows users to model time and concurrency. In particular, according
to the SystemC standard [6], if a given signal is written multiple times within an
evaluation phase, the last write wins. That means all writes other than the last one
is invisible in the simulation. The scheduling transformation must preserve signal
behavior during scheduling. We found two bugs in the synthesis tool which violate
the specification of SystemC. For simplicity, we provide the simplified version of
the programs, showing both pre- and post-scheduling designs in SystemC for easy
understanding.
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Fig. 4.4(a) shows a design before scheduling, where Out is an output sig-
nal of type sc uint<16>. According to the specification, the write statement
Out.write(a) in line 5 is invisible and invalid, therefore should be eliminated. In
another word, the only observable behavior should be the write statement in line
6. However, as shown in Fig. 4.4(b), the scheduling transformation scheduled the
two writes into two different states. In this case, both of the two writes are ob-
servable, which violates the SystemC standard. Algorithm 3 detects this violation
by checking that the two write statements are scheduled to two different states.
Fig. 4.5 shows another scheduling bug. According to the SystemC standard, If
a signal is written and read during the same evaluation phase, the old value will be
read. The value written will be available in the subsequent evaluation phase. In
Fig. 4.5(a), signal sig is written and read in the same cycle. Therefore variable j
will take the old value of sig. However, after scheduling, as shown in Fig. 4.5(b),
the read of sig is scheduled to the next cycle after the write. Variable j will take
the new value of sig instead of the old one.
4.5 RELATED WORK
Anderson [11] reports an early effort on the verification of as soon as possible
scheduling transformation using theorem proving. Narasimhan et al. [55] used the-
orem proving approach to verification of force-directed list scheduling algorithm for
resource-constrained scheduling in high-level synthesis. Karfa et al. [42] develops
techniques for more automated equivalence checking on scheduling transformation.
This framework converts the designs before and after scheduling transformation
into Finite State Machine with Datapath (FSMD) models, then checks the equiv-
alence of two FSMD models. The major difference between the above approaches
and our research is the observation that scheduling transformations can be extri-
cated from compiler transformations and handled as a verification of partitioning.
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This permits efficient static checking to validate these transformations, obviat-
ing expensive theorem proving or symbolic simulation techniques used in previous
work. The efficiency is critical in enabling application of our approach on large-
scale designs.
4.6 SUMMARY
Scheduling transformation is an important synthesis phase that significantly affects
the quality of the synthesis results. Therefore scheduling transformation usually
uses complex algorithms to satisfy user-specified timing and resource constraints.
In this chapter, we propose a simple and efficient approach to validating scheduling
transformations in behavioral synthesis. We characterize different widely used
scheduling modes, formalize equivalence relations to compare designs scheduled by
different modes, and propose efficient algorithms to validate designs scheduled by
each mode. Experiments on 12 synthesizable designs in S2CBench show that our
approach can successfully validate all designs within a few seconds. Furthermore,
our approach detected bugs in a commercial behavioral synthesis tool.
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Chapter 5
SCALING BACK-END RTL GENERATION CHECKING
5.1 EQUIVALENCE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
Previous work [36, 64] developed a sequential equivalence checking (SEC) frame-
work for behavioral synthesis. Fig. 5.1 shows the framework. It uses a formal
structure, Clocked Control/Data Flow Graph (CCDFG), as a uniform design ab-
straction after scheduling transformation, and takes the generated RTL circuit,
together with equivalence mapping points obtained from the behavioral synthesis
tool.
CCDFG Single Clock Cycle Simulation of CCDFG
Equivalent?
Circuit Single Clock Cycle Simulation of Circuit
Equivalence
Mapping
Input
Constraints
Yes. Fixed Point Computation
or Execution up to Given Bound
No
Figure 5.1: Dual-rail cycle-based symbolic simulation of a CCDFG and RTL cir-
cuit.
The key ingredients of the framework were (1) the use of a formal structure,
CCDFG as a uniform design abstraction, (2) a certified sequence of high-level
transformations to reduce the abstraction gap, (3) an SEC algorithm based on dual-
rail symbolic simulation between CCDFG and RTL, and (4) optimizations that
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enable compositional application of SEC exploiting internal cutpoints and modular
structures. Experimental results reported successful certification of synthesized
designs with tens of thousands of lines of RTL for ESL specifications of a number
of cryptographic algorithms.
Unfortunately, the above approach cannot directly handle certification of de-
signs from other domains that involve considerably less structure. In particular,
one key requirement to achieve compositionality in SEC is the availability of equiv-
alent internal operations or modules between the abstract CCDFG and the corre-
sponding RTL, which are then used as cutpoints. However, we found that for many
synthesized ESL designs, there are very few internal operations that preserve such
equivalence in the presence of design and implementation optimizations, thus un-
dermining compositionality and hence scalability. We present techniques for SEC
between ESL designs and synthesized RTL, in the presence of optimizations that
violate local equivalences of internal signals. Our key observation is that there are
two key sources of local inequivalence between CCDFG and RTL:
• Operation Gating: Behavioral synthesis tools often optimize the RTL by
introducing control structures or “guards” to ensure that certain operations
are executed only when their results are relevant to downstream computation,
and turned off otherwise. Such gated operations are functionally equivalent
to the behavioral specification only under these guards. This makes such an
operation difficult to identify; more problematically, it precludes the naive
approach of using it as a cutpoint by verifying it in isolation and replacing
it with an uninterpreted function in the CCDFG and RTL.
• Global Variables: Global variables are used commonly in ESL as a design
optimization: the user can then define some design functionalities as implicit
side effects of other design modules, reducing the lines-of-code in ESL de-
scription and thus improving compactness. Unfortunately, global variables
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break the compositional approach of verifying modules compositionally, since
the side effects on these variables must be accounted for during SEC.
In the next two sections, we present algorithms to enable compositional SEC
for behavioral synthesis in the presence of the above design and implementation
optimizations.
5.2 HANDLING OPERATION GATING OPTIMIZATION
The idea of operation gating is to add controlling predicates so that an operation
is not executed when the value computed is irrelevant to downstream computa-
tion. Behavioral synthesis tools generate optimized RTL with operation gating to
facilitate power-friendly hardware systems [21]. The transformation itself is com-
plex, and its details are not germane to this paper. The characteristic of operation
gating that is relevant to equivalence checking is that some operations have explic-
itly generated gating predicates in the synthesized RTL, when no such predicate
appears in the CCDFG. The effects of the operation on the CCDFG and the RTL
are then equivalent only when the gating predicate holds.
Consider synthesizing the code fragment shown in Fig. 5.2(a). According to
the semantics of C, the multiplication operation in Line 3 (and the assignment of
the result to c) must be executed regardless of the value of b. However, the result
of multiplication is only relevant to the eventual return value f when the value of
b is 1. In the RTL shown in Fig. 5.2(c), the multiplication operation is therefore
gated by condition b′ so it is only executed when b′ has the value 1.
Unfortunately, operation gating breaks compositionality. Recall from Sec-
tion 5.1 that a key optimization involved in scaling up SEC for behavioral synthesis
is the utilization of cutpoints. Cutpoints entail pre-verification of equivalence be-
tween corresponding internal variables in the CCDFG and the RTL, which are
then replaced by (equivalent) symbolic variables. However, since the output of a
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1 int foo(int a) {
2 bool b = a > 0;
3 int c = a * 3;
4 int d = a / 3;
5 int e = b ? c : d;
6 int f = e + a;
7 return f;
8 }
(a)
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Figure 5.2: Operation gating example. (a) C code. (b) Data flow graph. (c)
Schematic of generated RTL
gated operation is only equivalent when the gating condition is satisfied, its use
as a cutpoint will cause the pre-verification to report inequivalence, breaking the
compositional SEC flow.
To address this issue, we develop a relaxed checking algorithm for compositional
SEC between a CCDFG G and a circuit M that tolerates local, “irrelevant” in-
equivalences for individual variables. The key idea is to continue dual-rail symbolic
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simulation even when a local inequivalence is encountered, but keep track of these
inequivalences so that we can check if they are irrelevant during subsequent sym-
bolic simulation. Algorithm 4 provides a high-level presentation of our approach.
Here tk denotes the scheduling step in clock cycle k, EMap maps an operation
op in CCDFG to combinational node in M , and xk, sk, ik denote CCDFG state,
circuit state, and inputs in clock cycle k respectively. At any point, the algorithm
maintains a set, called InEqSet, of currently encountered variable inequivalences.
For our example, in Fig. 5.2, InEqSet will record the inequivalent pairs 〈c, c′〉
and 〈d, d′〉 between the CCDFG and the RTL when simulating Lines 3 and 4 re-
spectively. During subsequent symbolic simulation, whenever an equivalence is
discovered between variables in G and M , we check if that makes any of the in-
equivalences currently in InEqSet irrelevant. For instance, when simulating Line 5
we find that e and e′ are equivalent irrespective of the inequivalences between 〈c, c′〉
and 〈d, d′〉, making these two inequivalences irrelevant. When symbolic simulation
terminates, one of two outcomes is possible.
• InEqSet is empty, meaning all inequivalences encountered have been re-
solved (i.e., found irrelevant). The algorithm then reports G and M to be
equivalent.
• InEqSet still contains some inequivalences. This means that some operations
found inequivalent during symbolic simulation remain relevant even after fix-
point is reached. Thus the algorithm returns G and M to be inequivalent
(and outputs the unresolved inequivalences).
Algorithm 4 makes use of two key subroutines, Find-Gating-Info and Re-
solve-InEq to do the analysis of irrelevance of local inequivalences. To describe
these subroutines we first need a key definition below. For this definition, recall
that a Data Flow Graph (DFG) is a directed graph GD = (V,E), where each v ∈ V
is a variable in the program, each edge (x, y) ∈ E represents a data dependency,
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Algorithm 4: Relaxed-Checking(G,M)
1 k ← 0 . Set clock cycle to 0
2 InEqSet← ∅ . Empty inequivalence set
3 GInfo ← Find-Gating-Info(G)
4 while not (checking bound or fix-point reached) do
5 xk+1 ← Sim-CCDFG(G, tk, xk, ik)
6 sk+1 ← Sim-RTL(M, sk, EMap(ik))
7 foreach opg ∈ tk do
8 opm ← EMap(opg) . find the op in circuit M
9 if not Is-Equal(opg, opm) then . SMT query
10 InEqSet← InEqSet ∪ {〈opg, opm〉}
11 else
12 Resolve-InEq(InEqSet,GInfo, opg, opm)
13 k ← k + 1
14 if |InEqSet| = 0 then . All inequivalences resolved
15 return true
16 else
17 print InEqSet . Report all inequivalences
18 return false
meaning the value of variable y depends on the value of variable x. Furthermore,
we will assume that each node in GD is labeled with an operation (e.g., add, mul,
etc.).1
Definition 5.1 (Post Dominance). Let GD be a Data Flow Graph for a design,
and u and v be two variables. We say that u is post-dominated by v in GD iff u 6= v
1This assumption is valid in our case since the instructions in a CCDFG are in static single
assignment (SSA) form; thus each variable can be uniquely associated with one operation.
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and any path that starts from u goes through v.
Remark 5.1. Post-dominance is a common concept in compiler literature [27],
although it is typically defined with respect to the Control Flow Graph instead of
the DFG as above. The definition extends to a CCDFG G by taking GD to be
the DFG component of G. Given a variable mapping EMap, we can also extend
the notion to the circuit M : a variable u′ in the circuit is post-dominated by v′
if and only if (1) there are variables u and v in G that are mapped to u′ and v′
respectively, and (2) u is post-dominated by v. Thus we will often call 〈u, u′〉 to
be post-dominated by 〈v, v′〉.
The definition of post dominance guarantees that every path from u in GD
must go through v, e.g., in the example in Fig. 5.2(b), the variables c and d are
post-dominated by e. Let 〈u, u′〉 be post-dominated by variables 〈v, v′〉 in G and
M respectively. Then if v and v′ are equivalent, it follows that from the perspective
of any pair of corresponding variables 〈x, x′〉 that are descendants of 〈v, v′〉, the
equivalence or inequivalence of 〈u, u′〉 does not matter. For instance, in Fig. 5.2,
if e and e′ are equivalent, then the inequivalence of c and c′ is irrelevant. This
observation leads to the theorem below that is an easy consequence of data flow.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose G is a CCDFG and M is a circuit such that the following
hold: (1) variables 〈v, v′〉 are equivalent in G and M , and (2) 〈u, u′〉 are post-
dominated by 〈v, v′〉 respectively. Let 〈x, x′〉 be arbitrary corresponding descendants
of 〈v, v′〉. Then the equivalence between u and u′ is irrelevant to the equivalence of
x and x′.
We now discuss the two subroutines.
Find-Gating-Info. This subroutine finds the potential gating information for a
CCDFG G. A potential gating information is a list of pairs 〈v, U〉 where v is a
variable and U is a set of variables such that each variable u ∈ U is post-dominated
56
by v. Theorem 5.1 guarantees that if v is equivalent to v′ in G and M then the
inequivalences of variables in U are irrelevant. Our implementation exploits the
underlying LLVM constructs and information from the synthesis to efficiently de-
termine relevant post dominance information. In particular, LLVM has a special
select instruction of the form y = select cond x1 x2; the synthesis tool typ-
ically targets the condition variable of select instructions for operation gating.2
Function Find-Gating-Info crawls over the data flow graph of CCDFG G, first
identifying each select instruction; for each y it then finds all variables that are
post-dominated by y recursively.
Resolve-InEq. This function tries to resolve inequivalences in InEqSet using the
gating information found by Find-Gating-Info. Let 〈v, v′〉 be determined to be
equivalent during symbolic simulation. Then we find the set U such that 〈v, U〉 is a
pair computed by Find-Gating-Info. From the above discussion, inequivalences
involving variables in U are irrelevant, therefore dropped from InEqSet.
5.3 HANDLING GLOBAL VARIABLES
Modular design provides several advantages by breaking the design into modules.
One key optimization presented in previous work [36] is modular analysis. The
basic idea is to check each module individually in a bottom up manner.
• For each module M , check the equivalence of CCDFG and RTL.
• When checking module M ′ that calls M , replace the invocation of M in both
CCDFG and RTL by equivalent uninterpreted functions.
However, global variable usages break this modular view, and one must account
for side effects on these variables while performing modular analysis. Note that
2U need not be the complete set of variables post-dominated by v. This permits us to merely
consider conditions in the LLVM select instruction as potential gating information. This runs
the risk of possible spurious SEC failures. However, in our experience, this check has been
sufficient.
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Algorithm 5: Get-Extended-Signature(f)
1 I ← Parameters(f)
2 O ← Outputs(f)
3 VG ← Find-All-Globals(f)
4 foreach v ∈ VG do
5 switch Usage-Type(v) do
6 case R : I ← I ∪ {v} . read-only
7 case W : O ← O ∪ {v} . write-only
8 case RW : . read-and-write
9 I ← I ∪ {v}
10 O ← O ∪ {v};
11 return 〈I, O〉
while the side effects are implicit for high-level design descriptions (and hence
CCDFGs), they are explicit on the synthesized RTL since the synthesis tool usually
places the global variable on the interface when generating RTL.
We employ the similar approach to handling global variables as proposed in Sec-
tion 3.3. Different from the approach employed in front-end, where sub-functions
are invoked in the form of function calls, sub-modules in the RTL are instantiated
as sub-module. We compute an extended signature for a module that accounts for
globals explicitly. Algorithm 5 shows how to compute the extended signature of a
module. The key idea is to analyze the module to determine the globals used in the
module. The parameters of the module are then extended to include read-only and
read-write globals among the inputs and write-only and read-write globals among
the outputs. Extended signatures explicitly account for global variables during
modular analysis.
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5.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 5.1: Summary of CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Checking of Back-end
RTL Generation
App. Domain Design
Lines of code
C Functions RTL Modules
C RTL
Arithmetic DFADD 526 3722 17 5
DFDIV 436 5192 19 4
DFMUL 376 3115 16 2
DFSIN 755 11224 31 8
Microprocessor MIPS 232 2944 1 1
Media Processing ADPCM 541 14935 15 5
GSM 393 5598 12 4
JPEG 1692 32846 30 17
MOTION 583 6168 13 5
Security AES 716 11869 11 7
BLOWFISH 1406 17420 6 4
SHA 1284 18819 8 4
5.4.1 Performance Evaluation
We have applied our framework to certify synthesized RTL for all the ESL designs
in the CHStone benchmark. CHStone is a publicly available benchmark suite for
behavioral synthesis, that includes twelve designs selected from different applica-
tion domains. We used a commercial behavioral synthesis tool to synthesize the
RTL. The most complex design in the benchmark is JPEG which has more than
32K lines of RTL code. For our experiments we have used the benchmark designs
as is with one modification: two designs, JPEG and MOTION, used double pointers
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Table 5.2: Summary of Evaluation on CHStone Benchmark for Equivalence Check-
ing of Back-end RTL Generation
Design Operation Gating
Global Variablesa
Time (s) Memory (MB)
R W RW
DFADD Yes 4 0 1 174.9 169.34
DFDIV Yes 4 0 1 6946.1 594.87
DFMUL Yes 4 0 1 63.5 75.31
DFSIN Yes 6 0 1 7151.3 603.50
MIPS No 1 0 0 250.4 125.21
ADPCM No 15 19 63 68.2 105.45
GSM Yes 4 0 0 49.6 83.07
JPEG Yes 30 14 17 2187.3 375.90
MOTION Yes 9 0 4 1515.1 408.77
AES Yes 4 0 5 170.7 106.59
BLOWFISH No 3 0 4 44.9 91.89
SHA No 3 0 4 6.0 89.04
aR means read-only, W means write-only, and RW means read-and-write.
to represent two-dimensional arrays; these were modified to eliminate the double-
pointer and represent the arrays explicitly. The reason has to do with the quirks
of the synthesis tool used in this experiment. The synthesis tool inlines functions
that have double pointers, thus flattening the module structure in the synthesized
RTL. In addition to generating significantly larger RTL, this also destroys the
module structure in the synthesized design. Since scalability of modular analysis
(in the presence of design optimizations) is the key target of the experiments, we
found the original designs unsuitable as targets for evaluation. The experiments
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were conducted on a workstation with 3GHz Intel Xeon processor and 8GB mem-
ory. For each design, we checked the equivalence between its CCDFG and RTL
via dual-rail symbolic simulation, which symbolically simulates the CCDFG and
RTL clock cycle by clock cycle. After each clock cycle, we checked the equality
of mapped variables in the CCDFG and RTL by the MathSAT SMT solver [13].
We also applied cutpoints, cut-loop, and modular analysis optimizations when
checking each design.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 show the results of the experiments. The JPEG design takes
about 36 minutes with 375.9 MB memory usage. The maximum certification time
is required for DFSIN, which takes around 119 minutes with 603.5 MB memory
usage. The experiment results demonstrate that independent of application do-
main our framework scales up to designs of practical complexity. No other SEC
framework to our knowledge can handle behaviorally synthesized designs at this
scale. Furthermore, only MIPS can be certified without handling operation gating
and global variable optimizations.
5.4.2 A Behavioral Synthesis Bug
Our experiments found a bug in the synthesis tool during the certification of the
MOTION design, which is a C implementation of a motion vector decoding algorithm
for MPEG-2. Fig. 5.3 shows the source code fragment that triggers the bug.
Here ld Bfr is a global variable. In function Get Bits, the return value Val is
computed by right-shifting ld Bfr. After Val is computed, ld Bfr is updated in
the subroutine Flush Buffer. The update performed by Flush Buffer does not
affect the return value. Fig. 5.4(a) shows the RTL implementation synthesized by
the behavioral synthesis tool. The global variable ld Bfr is synthesized to a register
outside of module Get Bits. The output of Get Bits is thus a combinational
circuit with ld Bfr as input. Therefore, when sub-module Flush Buffer produces
a new data for ld Bfr, the new data is propagated to the output in the same clock
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1 void Flush_Buffer(int N) {
2 // modify the global variable
3 ld_Bfr = update(N, ld_Bfr);
4 }
5 unsigned int Get_Bits(int N){
6 unsigned int Val;
7 Val = ld_Bfr >> (32 - N);
8 Flush_Buffer(N);
9 return Val;
10 }
Figure 5.3: Simplified C source code of the MOTION example.
cycle, leading to a wrong output.
The bug is caused because behavioral synthesis applies aggressive transfor-
mations to minimize resource usage. As can be seen by comparing Figs. 5.4(a)
and 5.4(b), the synthesis tool in this case eliminates a register without correctly
taking into account the side effect on the global variable. Such subtleties reinforce
the need for SEC for certification of synthesized RTL designs. The bug has been
confirmed by developers of the synthesis tool and fixed in a new release.
5.5 RELATED WORK
Recently increasing sophistication of behavioral synthesis has resulted in several
SEC optimizations to scale up certification of synthesized RTL [34, 36, 41, 45, 47].
For instance, Koebl et al. [44] provide a good overview of research in SEC between
high-level and RTL designs. Vasudevan et al. [70] introduce sequential compare
points as a set of observable signals to be compared between high-level designs
and RTL. There are commercial tools [16, 45] that can apply SEC between RTL
and high-level (C/C++/SystemC) models. However, we have found no published
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Figure 5.4: Bug found in the MOTION example, where an important register is
eliminated. (a). Wrong RTL (b). Correct RTL
results on approaches to handling design and implementation optimizations in
any certification framework for behavioral synthesis. There has however been re-
search on handling such optimizations in SEC comparing RTL and netlist designs.
Baumgartner et al. [12] discuss an approach for invariant generation to address the
conditional equivalence checking problem for optimizations including clock gating
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and power gating. Moon et al. [54] propose equivalence checking techniques that
exploit well-partitioned circuit structures.
5.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented algorithms that enables compositional SEC for behav-
ioral synthesis in the presence of the two design and implementation optimizations.
1. We develop an algorithm for relaxed SEC that includes identification and
compositional use of gated variables. The approach tolerates local, “irrele-
vant” inequivalences between gated variables and their RTL counterparts, as
long as the inequivalences are resolved during symbolic simulation of down-
stream computation.
2. We develop an approach to modeling the side effects of global variables ex-
plicitly and show how the approach can then be used with modular analysis.
The algorithms, albeit not individually complex, have been carefully developed
to (1) exploit the constraints and invariants available from the behavioral synthesis
process, and (2) reinforce the available SEC optimizations, facilitating smooth
integration. As a result, our back-end SEC scales to practical designs: it can
handle all designs of the CHStone benchmark, some of which have more than
32K LoC synthesized RTL. We do not know of any other tool that can handle
diverse designs at this scale, and the algorithms presented here are crucial to this
scalability. Finally, we found a subtle bug in an optimization of the behavioral
synthesis tool itself, demonstrating both the need for certification of behaviorally
synthesized designs and the importance of SEC in general and our framework in
particular to achieve such certification.
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Chapter 6
INTERFACE SYNTHESIS CHECKING
Previous chapters mainly focus on module level (block level) equivalence checking
in behavioral synthesis. We reason about the equivalence between the high-level
design and the synthesized low-level implementation on a module-by-module ba-
sis. In this chapter, we focus on the interfaces between modules in a design. In
particular, we focus on detecting deadlocks introduced by interface synthesis.
Most behavioral synthesis tools support interface synthesis, which allows the
user to map the interfaces of a high-level design to some pre-defined interface com-
ponents [28, 33, 73], e.g., the user can map an array on the argument list of a
high-level function to a memory interface in the RTL. Interface synthesis may add
additional RTL ports with associated I/O handshaking protocols. Some interface
components have complicated timing and communication protocols. Interface syn-
thesis is also a complex and error-prone process. In practice, bugs appear often on
the interfaces between different modules in a design.
In the high-level sequential programs in C, functions communicate with each
other through arguments passing and global variables sharing, and functions are
executed one at a time. However, in the synthesize hardware, there can be concur-
rent blocks that are connected by synthesized interfaces of different types. Con-
verting a high-level sequential specification into concurrent RTL blocks that are
connected with interfaces of different handshaking protocols may introduce dead-
locks. In this chapter, we first introduce different commonly used interfaces and
their handshaking protocols. We then discuss the deadlock situations, and present
an approach to detection of deadlocks.
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6.1 INTERFACE SYNTHESIS
For C based designs, a function communicates with the other part of the system
through global variables, function arguments, and function return value. Interface
synthesis transforms each individual function argument and the return value into
RTL interfaces with user-specified communication protocols. Fig. 6.1 shows an
example of interface synthesis of a C function into an RTL block. We can see that
the input and outputs are synthesized into interfaces with different handshaking
protocols.
Most high-level synthesis tools support different handshaking protocols: e.g. no
handshaking (Pnone), one-way handshaking (Pack and Pvld), two-way handshaking
(Pack-vld), streaming (Pfifo) and memory (Pmem) interfaces:
void func(int *IN, // input
          int *O1, // output
          int *O2) // output
{
    int t = *IN;
    *O1   = t + 1;
    *O2   = t + 2;
}
func
IN
IN_vld
clk
O1
O1_ack
O2
O2_vld
O2_ack
(a) (b)
Figure 6.1: Example of interface synthesis. (a). A simple C function with one
input and two outputs. (b). Synthesized block diagram of the C function. Input
IN has an associated valid signal IN vld to indicate when IN is ready to be read.
Output O1 has an associated acknowledge signal O1 ack to allow the downstream
block to acknowledge block ‘func’ that the output data O1 has been read. Output
O 2 has both valid and acknowledge signals.
• Pnone: wire or register interface will be created. There is no additional signal
generated to indicate when data is read or written.
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clk
IN 5
IN vld
O1 6
O1 ack
O2 7
O2 vld
O2 ack
Figure 6.2: Timing diagram of the synthesized block ‘func’.
• Pack: for an input port, an additional output port is created to acknowledge
the upstream block that the data has been read. Similarly, for an output port,
an additional input port will be created to acknowledge the downstream block
that the data has been read. The output will be held until the acknowledge
signal is received. For example, the output O1 of the C function ‘func’ in
Fig. 6.1(a) is synthesized with the protocol Pack. An additional input port
O1 ack, as shown in Fig. 6.1(b), is generated. We can see from the timing
diagram shown in Fig. 6.2 that the value 6 is held until signal O1 ack goes
to high. It is worth noting that when using Pack protocol, a block cannot
write any data until the previous data is received by the downstream block.
• Pvld: an additional port will be created to indicate that the data is ready to
be read. When a block tries to read a value from an upstream block, it waits
until the associated valid signal goes to high. For example, the input IN of
the C function ‘func’ in Fig. 6.1(a) is synthesized with the protocol Pvld.
An additional input port IN vld, as shown in Fig. 6.1(b), is generated. In
the timing diagram shown in Fig. 6.2, we can see that signal IN vld goes to
high at the third clock cycle, which indicates that the value 5 on the port IN
is valid to be read.
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• Pack-vld: this two-way handshaking protocol combines the protocol Pack and
Pvld, which not only indicates when the data is valid to be read, but also
allows the downstream block to acknowledge the data has been read. For
example, the output O2 in Fig. 6.1 is synthesized with Pack-vld protocol.
From the timing diagram in Fig. 6.2, we can see that the value 7 stays valid
and held (for three cycles in this example) by block func until block func
receives the acknowledge signal from the downstream block.
FIFO
data_out
read
clk
data_in
write
full
reset
empty
read 
port
write 
port
Figure 6.3: Block diagram of a FIFO with read and write ports. Signals empty
and full indicate the emptiness and fullness of the FIFO.
clk
reset
data in D1 D2
write
full
data out D1 D2
read
empty
Figure 6.4: Timing diagram of a FIFO with depth of 2.
• Pfifo: this interface protocol is often used for streaming data between two
blocks. Fig. 6.3 shows the block diagram of a FIFO (first-in, first-out) with a
read and a write port. Each FIFO has a user-specified depth. Signal empty
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goes to low if the FIFO is empty. Similarly, signal full goes to low if the
FIFO is full. Fig. 6.4 shows the timing diagram of a FIFO with depth of 2.
Suppose the FIFO is empty initially, then after two writes to the FIFO, the
FIFO is full (signal full goes to low). It becomes empty again after two
reads. No reads can be performed when FIFO is empty, and no writes can
be performed when the FIFO is full. In other words, reading of an empty
FIFO or writing to a full FIFO is a blocking operation.
• Pmem: this interface protocol, which is often used for array arguments in C, is
synthesized to connect to memories (ROMs and RAMs) in RTL implemen-
tations.
6.2 DEADLOCK DETECTION
6.2.1 Deadlock Example
C/C++ based untimed designs are required to be single-threaded programs by
most behavioral synthesis tools . In reality, hardware blocks synthesized from
functions may run concurrently. Designers can synthesize concurrent hardware
blocks by applying constraints to single-threaded C/C++ functions or interfaces
to improve throughput. However, making blocks run concurrently may introduce
deadlocks. Among all available interfaces, FIFOs are often used to implement
streaming behavior between blocks. Since FIFO read and write may be block-
ing operations, insufficient depth of FIFOs may lead to system deadlock. Most
practical designs require designers to manually set the depth of each FIFO [28].
Consider an example shown in Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6. Fig. 6.6 shows the syn-
thesized design with three blocks: BLOCK1, BLOCK2 and BLOCK3 from the high-level
specification shown in Fig. 6.5. Interfaces B, C and D are FIFOs of depth of 1, 2
and 1, respectively. Suppose that BLOCK1 has a fixed latency of 1. It tries to push
a new value to FIFO B and a new value to FIFO C at every clock cycle. Suppose
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1 void BLOCK1(int *I, int *O1, int *O2) {
2 int t = *I;
3 *O1 = t + 1;
4 *O2 = t - 1;
5 }
6 void BLOCK2(volatile int *I, int *O) {
7 int t = *I;
8 t += *I;
9 t += *I;
10 *O = t/3;
11 }
12 void BLOCK3(int *I1, int *I2, int *O) {
13 *O = *I1 + *I2;
14 }
15 void top(int A, int E) {
16 int B, C, D;
17 BLOCK1(&A, &B, &C);
18 BLOCK2(&B, &D);
19 BLOCK3(&D, &E);
20 }
Figure 6.5: A design in C with three blocks.
BLOCK2 has a latency of 3, it reads three values (one at each clock cycle), and then
pushes the average of the three values into the FIFO D. BLOCK3 reads the values
from FIFO C and D at the same clock cycle, and returns the sum of the two values
as output E. Suppose input A is available all the time. BLOCK1 stalls after pushing
two values to FIFO C, because FIFO C is full. BLOCK2 now has already read two
values from FIFO B, and is waiting for the third value in order to calculate the
average. BLOCK2 stalls because FIFO B is empty, since BLOCK1 stalls and cannot
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BLOCK1A
BLOCK2
BLOCK3
B D
C
E
(a)
BLOCK1A
BLOCK2
BLOCK3
B D
C
E
full
emptyempty
(b)
Figure 6.6: Deadlock example: a synthesized design with three blocks. Interface C
is a FIFO of depth of 2. Interfaces B and D are FIFOs of depth of 1. (a). FIFOs
are initialize to be empty. (b). Status of FIFOs when the design deadlocks.
produce more data to FIFO B. BLOCK3 stalls because FIFO D is empty. As a re-
sult, the design deadlocks because every block is waiting for other blocks to make
progress in order to continue the execution.
From the above example, we can see that synthesizing concurrently running
blocks from a sequential specification could introduce deadlocks. It is a non-trivial
task to analyze the possibilities of deadlock situations of a design when the design
contains complex logic. Therefore, a deadlock detection approach is highly desired.
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6.2.2 Deadlock Detection Algorithm
Assertion-based verification is a widely used verification methodology in hardware
design community. Designers use assertion languages, such as Property Specifica-
tion Language (PSL) [2] and SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) [7], to capture the
intent of a design, and use simulation or formal verification tools to verify that the
design correctly implements that intent. In the context of deadlock detection, de-
signers usually manually write the assertions in RTL to capture the deadlocks in a
particular design in practice. However, synthesized RTL implementations from be-
havioral synthesis tools are generally not human readable. Systematically writing
sufficient assertions to capture deadlocks and debugging deadlocks in behaviorally
synthesized RTL designs are often difficult. Therefore, it is highly desired to design
an algorithm to automatically generate the assertions for detection of deadlocks
in the synthesized RTL designs. Since we can obtain the types of interfaces and
the variables mappings between the CCDFG and the RTL design from the syn-
thesis report, it is feasible to automatically generate the assertions to capture the
deadlock conditions in the synthesized RTL designs.
Definition 6.1 (Blocking Interface). An interface I of a module A is said to be a
blocking interface of A if I/O operations in A of the interface I may need to wait
until a certain condition is satisfied.
An I/O operation on a blocking interface is called a blocking I/O operation.
For example, reading data from an interface with Pvld protocol is a blocking I/O
operation, because it may need to wait until the associated valid signal is high.
Similarly, writing data to an interface with Pack protocol, reading or writing data
from an interface with two-way handshaking protocol or Pfifo are also blocking
I/O operations.
Definition 6.2 (Interface Dependency). Suppose that blocks A and B are con-
nected with an interface I. We say A depends on B if there is blocking I/O
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operation on interface I in A.
For example, if block A has an output with interface protocol Pvld, and block
B takes A’s output as input, then B depends on A. Because when B reads the
input, it may need to wait until the data is available. However, A does not depend
on B in this case, because there is no acknowledge signal from B, thus A can
output at any time. If A and B are connected with an interface with Pack-vld or
Pfifo protocol, then A and B depend on each other.
With the definition of interface dependency, given a multiple-block design that
are connected with a set of interfaces, we can construct a dependency graph G =
(V,E), where G is a directed graph, V is the set of blocks in the design, each
edge (bi, bj) ∈ E denotes that block bi depends on block bj. Fig. 6.7 shows the
dependency graph of the three-block design shown in Fig. 6.6. Since interface B,
C and D are FIFOs, each block depends on the other two blocks. Therefore, there
may be deadlock situations.
BLOCK1
BLOCK2 BLOCK3
Figure 6.7: Dependency graph of Fig. 6.6.
A set D = {B1, . . . , Bm } of m (m > 1) blocks in a top-level design T is
deadlocked if the following conditions hold:
• The inputs are available for T.
• Each block is waiting for the availability of some I/Os.
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• No block can make any I/Os available while waiting.
Intuitively, at certain clock cycle, the inputs are available to the design. How-
ever, none of the blocks can make progress, and every block is waiting for other
blocks to make progress in order to continue its own execution.
Let G be the dependency graph of a multi-block design. If there are any strongly
connected components [23] in graph G, then there are deadlock possibilities in the
design [65]. There are linear-time algorithms [23,30,68] to find strongly connected
components of a directed graph. Note that We also need to identify a set of blocks
Si that can reach a strongly connected component S. Because some blocks in the
strongly connected component S depend on blocks in Si, progresses made in Si
may resolve the deadlock situation in S. Therefore, in order to claim that there is
a deadlock in S, we must make sure that blocks in Si are also not making progress.
A
B
D
C
E
F
Figure 6.8: Dependency graph example
Consider an example shown in Fig. 6.8. Fig. 6.8 shows the dependency graph
of a design which consists of six blocks. There is a strongly connected component
{ B, C, D, E }. The strongly connected component depends on block F. Therefore,
when claiming that there is a deadlock in { B, C, D, E }, we need to consider the
status of block F.
Now we introduce the deadlock condition generation algorithms. Let the top-
level block T = { b1, . . . , bn } contain n concurrently running sub-blocks. Algo-
rithm 6 generates deadlock assertions from T . Condition inputs available asserts
that inputs of T are available. In other words, the design T deadlocks not because
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Algorithm 6: Gen-Dead-Lock-Assertions(T )
1 { b1, . . . , bn } ← T
2 { I1, . . . , Ik } ← Get-Inputs(T )
3 inputs available← ∧ki=1 Is-Available(Ii)
4 G← Build-DepGraph(b1, . . . , bn) . build the dependency graph of blocks
5 Scc← Find-Scc(G) . find strongly connected components
6 Lock ← ∅
7 foreach C = 〈V,E〉 ∈ Scc do
8 V ′ ← Find-Nodes-that-Scc-Reaches(G,C)
9 Lock ← Lock ∪ { V ∪ V ′ }
10 foreach { v1, . . . , vm } ∈ Lock do
11 stall cond← ∧mi=1 Generate-Stall-Assertions(vi)
12 Output-Assertion(inputs available ∧ stall cond)
Algorithm 7: Generate-Stall-Assertions(block)
1 〈CCDFG,RTL〉 ← block
2 cond← ∅
3 foreach state ∈ CCDFG do
4 foreach op ∈ state do
5 if Is-Blocking-IO-Operation(op) then
6 I ← Get-Interface(op)
7 assertion← (RTL.current state = state) ∧Not-Available(I)
8 cond← cond ∪ assertion
9 return
∨|cond|
i=1 cond[i]
of unavailability of inputs of T . Variable G is the dependency graphs of the blocks
of T , and Scc contains the strongly connected components of G. For each of the
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strongly connected components, we expand the node set V to include nodes that V
can reach. Then Lock contains the expanded sets of nodes that may contain dead-
locks. For each set of nodes { v1, . . . , vm } that may have deadlock, we generate
stall assertions of each node vi. stall cond is a conjunction of the stall conditions
of nodes { v1, . . . , vm }. We then output the assertion by combining the condition
inputs available with stall conditions stall cond.
Function Generate-Stall-Assertions in Algorithm 7 generates the stall
condition assertions on a given block. It iterates over all the states in the CCDFG,
and finds all blocking I/O operations of within a state. Function Not-Available
asserts that the interface I is not available, and the blocking operation op is waiting
for the availability of I. The assertion means that if the state machine of the RTL
is at the state where I will be read or written but is not available, then the state
machine stalls at the state, and waits for I until it becomes available. The return is
a union of all stall conditions, which means the block stalls if any of the condition
holds.
After generating the assertions that capture deadlock conditions, we can use
simulation or formal verification tools to catch the assertions. There are commer-
cially available mature RTL simulation tools, e.g., “Incisive Enterprise Simulator”
from Cadence, “Questa Simulation” from Mentor Graphics, and “VCS” from Syn-
opsys, as well as formal verification tools, e.g., “Incisive Formal Verifier” and
“JasperGold Formal Property Verification App” from Cadence, “Questa Formal
Verification” from Mentor Graphics, “VC Formal” from Synopsys.
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluated the effectiveness of the deadlock detection approach on two case
studies: DCT and YUV Filter. The experiments were conducted on a workstation
with Debian 7.1 running on a 2.93 GHz Intel Xeon X3470 processor with 8 GB of
memory. We use “Questa Simulation” as the simulator to simulate the synthesized
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RTL augmented with our generated assertions.
pre
process
DCT
post
process
...
FIFO A FIFO B
FIFO C
Figure 6.9: Block diagram of DCT example.
Fig. 6.9 shows the diagram of the DCT design. It consists of three blocks: block
‘pre-process’ processes the input raw data; block ‘DCT’ does the discrete cosine
transform on the pre-processed data; and block ‘post-process’ does some analysis
of the data before and after the transformation. This design has 136 lines of C
code, and 1966 lines of synthesized Verilog code. The depths of FIFO A and FIFO
B were set to 2. We also experimented with different depths of FIFO C, the design
would deadlock if the depth of C was less than 512. It took 1.93 seconds and 16.52
MB of memory to catch the deadlock assertion.
RGB2YUVRGB
Image
Process
YUV2RGB
stats
FIFO A FIFO B
FIFO C
FIFO D
Figure 6.10: Block diagram of YUV Filter example.
Fig. 6.10 shows the diagram of the YUV Filter design, which consists of four
blocks. The design first converts the input stream of RGB model to YUV model,
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applies some transformation on the stream of YUV model, converts the stream
back to RGB model, and does some statistics of the filter. The design has 276
lines of C code, and 5360 lines of synthesized Verilog code. The depths of the
FIFOs are all set to 2. It took 46.16 seconds and 60.71 MB of memory to catch
the deadlock assertion.
The two case studies all have a fork-then-join structure in the block diagrams.
If the latencies are not balanced in different paths of a design, the design will
deadlock. However, if the blocks have variable latencies, it is difficult to determine
the existence of deadlocks statically. Deadlocks also often happen in designs with
feedback loop structures. The automatically generated assertions will help the
designers to detect the deadlocks either by dynamic simulation or by static formal
verification tools.
6.4 RELATED WORK
In the context of distributed systems and databases, deadlocks happen whenever
two or more processes are competing for limited resources. The processes are
holding resources (thus preventing other processes from using them) while waiting
for other resources. Deadlock detection is a well-studied problem in distributed
systems and databases [9, 46]. Most approaches utilize the wait-for graph which
captures the resource dependencies among processes. In a wait-for graph, nodes
are used to represent processes, each edge (p, q) represents that process q is holding
a resource that process p needs, therefore p is waiting for q. If there are circular
waits among processes, then there are possibilities for deadlocks to happen. Graph
cycle detection algorithms are often used for deadlock detection.
Deadlock detection is important for concurrent programming [8]. For example,
there has been research on detecting deadlocks of concurrent Java programs [25].
This approach translates Java programs into Promela [39] language, and uses
SPIN [40] model checker to perform formal analysis of deadlocks.
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SystemC [6] is one of the most popular languages for system-level modeling. It
allows the designers to model concurrency through modules and processes. Events,
channels and shared variables can be used for module-level and inter-process com-
munications. There has been research on data race detection of SystemC designs
using static analysis approach [53]. One major issue with static analysis of dead-
locks is that it may produce false alarms. There also has been research on formal
deadlock checking of SystemC designs [18]. Symbolic simulation techniques are
used to generate formulas for deadlock conditions.
6.5 SUMMARY
Behavioral synthesis generates high-performance RTL implementations by taking
advantage of the concurrent nature of hardware resources. Converting a sequential
high-level design into a multi-block concurrent implementation interconnected by
synthesized interfaces with different handshaking protocols may introduce dead-
locks. To detect the deadlocks, the designers often manually write assertions that
can capture the deadlocks, and use either simulation or formal verification tools to
catch the assertions. However, the synthesized RTL implementations are generally
not human readable, they are intended to be consumed by downstream tools, not
by designers. Therefore, manually writing sufficient assertions about deadlocks
requires heavy human effort. We present an assertion-based verification approach
to detecting deadlocks of the synthesized RTL implementations. Our algorithms
take the design representation after the scheduling transformation and the result of
the interface synthesis from the synthesis tool, automatically generate SystemVer-
ilog assertions that can capture deadlock situations. For behavioral synthesis tool
vendors, this approach can be implemented in the back-end when generating RTL
implementations. Optionally, the users can instruct the behavioral synthesis tool
to generate the assertions along with the RTL implementations for further verifi-
cation purposes.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 CONCLUSION
Equivalence checking support is critical to the adoption of behavioral synthesis
tools. In this dissertation research, we present an end-to-end scalable equiva-
lence checking framework for the entire behavioral synthesis flow, which includes
front-end compiler transformations, scheduling transformation, and back-end RTL
generation. We design and develop the equivalence checking frameworks and al-
gorithms for different phases of the behavioral synthesis flow. This dissertation
makes the following specific contributions:
• Design and develop an equivalence checking framework for front-end compiler
transformations via symbolically exploring paths of the source and target
programs of each transformation applied.
• Develop efficient algorithms to validate scheduling transformations, including
validating control and data dependencies and I/O timing of partially timed
SystemC designs.
• Develop several techniques to handle design and implementation optimiza-
tions employed by behavioral synthesis tools. They are essential to the scal-
ability of the back-end checker.
• Develop an assertion-based verification approach to detecting deadlocks in-
troduced by concurrent RTL blocks that are interconnected by synthesized
interfaces with various handshaking protocol.
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According to experiments on the CHStone [37] benchmark synthesized by an
open-source behavioral synthesis tool named LegUp [17], our front-end transfor-
mation equivalence checker scales to large-size designs. We are able to validate
more than 75% of transformations applied by LegUp to CHStone benchmark. We
evaluate our scheduling transformation validation approach on 12 synthesizable
SystemC based designs in S2CBench [66] benchmark. The results show that our
approach is efficient, and is able to validate the scheduling transformations on de-
signs in S2CBench benchmark under 10 seconds. Our back-end checker handles
global variables and tolerates local and irrelevant in-equivalences introduced by
operation gating in the behavioral synthesis. The optimizations we developed are
essential to make our back-end equivalence checker scale to real industrial-size de-
signs. We detected a real bug in a widely used commercial behavioral synthesis
tool, reported the bug to the developer. They fixed the bug in their next release.
Case studies show that our assertion-based deadlock detection approach is able to
catch deadlocks introduced by parallelization of RTL blocks that are connected by
synthesized interfaces.
7.2 FUTURE WORK
One future direction is to extend our SEC framework to handle more aggressive
transformations. The fact that we still cannot certify 25 percent of the transfor-
mations in CHStone shows that there is significant room for improvement. The
future extensions include 1) equivalence checking for transformations spanning
multiple procedures or functions, 2) handling transformations that modify struc-
tures of loops, perhaps through domain-specific SEC optimizations. Recall that
a key reason for our inability to handle the transformations where SEC fails is
the inapplicability of cut-loop, which requires equivalence for each iteration of cor-
responding loops of the two programs. There is a need for ways to loosen that
restriction so that transformations such as partial loop unrolling can be certified.
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Scheduling transformation that involves pipelining (either loop pipeline or func-
tion pipeline) is not address in this dissertation. My colleagues have done a lot
of research on using equivalence checking and theorem proving techniques to ver-
ify loop pipelining [34, 60, 61] and function pipelining [35] in behavioral synthesis.
Their approach is to generate a reference pipeline model by taking the pipelining
parameters that are provided by the behavioral synthesis tool, and use SEC to
check the equivalence between the reference model and the generated RTL. An
interesting future work is to view the pipelining process as a generic transforma-
tion which manipulates the CDFG, and directly check the equivalence between the
sequential CDFG and the pipelined CDFG.
For interface synthesis, currently we only focus on deadlock detection of concur-
rent RTL blocks interconnected by synthesized interfaces with various handshaking
protocols. The correctness verification of interface synthesis has not been explored.
For example, array arguments in a C function can be mapped to memory interfaces.
Optimizations such as 1) partitioning an array in to multiple small memories or
registers, 2) combining multiple arrays into one single memory interface, 3) chang-
ing the word-width of a memory interface are also interesting and challenging to
verify.
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